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Where  Do  We  Stand? 
THE  BROOKINGS  PANEL  on Economic  Activity  for the past ten years  has 
mirrored  much  of the exciting  theory  and  empirical  work  in open-economy 
macroeconomics.  In the spirit of Brookings,  the papers have explored 
what  issues openness  raises  for macroeconomic  management.  The range 
of interests  has been quite  broad,  beginning  with  William  Branson's  "new 
view of international  capital movements"  and including  Marina  Whit- 
man's  dismissal  of "global  monetarism"  and  many  of the topics  of the day 
from trade equations  and oil to commodity  booms, debt, and portfolio 
selection.' The questions  have been similar-how  much independence 
there  is for macroeconomic  policy in an interdependent  world;  how im- 
portant  monetary  factors  are;  or how can the interest  rate be kept lower 
than the market  will bear. The papers  have emphasized  the evolution  of 
open-economy  macroeconomics  from the structure  of the 1960s-the 
Mundell-Fleming  model-to  a framework  better  suited  to the analysis  of 
inflation,  expectations,  and  portfolio  substitution. 
This paper  maintains  the tradition  of asking  how international  inter- 
dependence  has  impinged  on macroeconomic  variables  and  policy  options. 
The paper  takes  as its frame  of reference  the experience  with  floating  ex- 
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change  rates  and seeks  to explain,  in the light of today's  theories,  the pat- 
tern  of exchange  rate  movements  and  policy  responses. 
The  main  lessons  that  emerge  from  the analysis  concern  the inadequacy 
of the monetary  approach  as a complete  theory  of exchange  rate  determi- 
nation, the central  role of the current  account  in influencing  exchange 
rates,  the suggestion  that  there  is a deutsche  mark  shortage  and,  finally,  the 
conclusion  that an interest  rate policy not oriented  toward  the external 
balance  has  aggravated  exchange  rate  instability. 
The paper  is divided  into two parts.  In the first  part,  developments  in 
exchange  rates are analyzed  using a variety  of models, starting  with the 
monetary  approach,  and leading  from there to models of exchange  rate 
dynamics  and  the current  account.  I show  that  unanticipated  disturbances 
to the current  account  have been an important  source of unanticipated 
movements  in exchange  rates.  In addition,  the structure  of real  returns  on 
securities  denominated  in different  currencies  suggests  that the deutsche 
mark  should  be occupying  an important  share  in internationally  diversi- 
fied  portfolios,  and  that  substitution  in that  direction  may  well explain  the 
persisting  tendency  for that currency  to appreciate  in real terms. 
In the last part of the paper  I address  the important  question  of how 
the system  of flexible  exchange  rates  has  been operated.  A review  of inter- 
vention  and interest  rate policies in key countries  suggests  that external 
constraints  have not been predominant.  On the contrary,  interest  rate 
policies have been pursued  quite independently  of a desire to finance 
imbalances  in current  accounts  through  capital  flows;  and that indepen- 
dence  has led to growing  requirements  for intervention.  The proposal  by 
James  Tobin for a tax on foreign  exchange  transactions  is considered  in 
this context. 
The  paper  concludes  with  the demonstration  that  much  of the observed 
instability  in exchange  rates  has been due to unanticipated  disturbances, 
with  the forecasting  errors  broadly  shared  by governments  and  the public 
alike. The instability  has been aggravated,  however,  by a failure  to use 
monetary  policy with a view to the external  balance  and by a failure  to 
recognize  portfolio  shifts  toward  marks  as part  of the adjustment  process 
to the regime  of flexible  exchange  rates. 
Exchange  Rate  Theories  and  Empirical  Evidence 
There  are  basically  three  views  of the exchange  rate.  The first  takes  the 
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price  of goods;  and  the third,  the relative  price  of bonds.  I regard  any one 
of these  views  as a partial  picture  of exchange  rate  determination,  although 
each  may  be especially  important  in explaining  a particular  historical  epi- 
sode. Still,  it is useful  to approach  exchange  rate  theory  not from  the com- 
plex perspective  of an all-encompassing  model,  but rather  from the van- 
tage  point  of a sharply  articulated,  partial  model.  The monetary  approach 
is a good  place  to start.  Although  in the  opinions  of some  of its proponents 
it represents  a quite  complete  theory  of the exchange  rate, I will expand 
it to a more general  theory  by relaxing  some of the special assumptions 
that  are  required  if it is to stand  on its own. 
THE  MONETARY  APPROACH 
At the outset  of flexible  rates  in the 1970s, the literature  emphasized  a 
monetary  interpretation  of exchange  rate  determination.2  Most  versions  of 
the monetary  approach  assume  strict  purchasing  power  parity  (PPP). Ex- 
change  rates  move promptly  in order  to maintain  the international  link- 
age of prices.  Thus there is no room for changes  in the terms of trade. 
With e denoting  the logarithm  of the home currency  price of foreign 
exchange,  and p and p* denoting the logarithm  of home and foreign 
prices, respectively,  PPP implies3 
(1)  e = p-p*, 
where here and throughout  the paper variables  in lowercase (except 
interest  rates) represent  logarithms. 
The next step  in the monetary  approach  is to take  prices  as determined 
by domestic  nominal  money supply and real money demand.  With real 
money  demand  depending  on real income and the nominal  interest  rate, 
the expression  becomes 
(2)  p=  n-ky+hi 
p * =  M-  ky*  +  hi*, 
2.  See the collection of papers in Scandinavian  Journal  of Economics, vol. 78, no. 
2 (1976), pp. 133-412; the papers collected in Jacob A. Frenkel and Harry G. John- 
son, eds., The Economics of  Exchange Rates: Selected Studies (Addison-Wesley, 
1978); John F. 0.  Bilson, "The Monetary Approach to the Exchange Rate: Some 
Empirical Evidence," IMF  Stafi Papers, vol.  25  (March 1978),  pp. 48-75;  and 
Jacob A. Frenkel, "Exchange  Rates, Prices, and Money: Lessons from the 1920's," 
American  Economic Review, vol. 70 (May 1980, Papers  and Proceedings,  1979), pp. 
235-42. 
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where 
m =  logarithm of nominal money 
k =  income  elasticity  of real  money  demand 
y  =  logarithm of  real income 
h =  semilogarithmic  interest  response  of real balances 
i =  nominal interest rate. 
Combining  equations  1 and 2 yields  the exchange  rate equation  of the 
monetary  approach: 
(3)  e = m-m*  +  h(i-i*)-k(y-y*), 
where  coefficients  are  assumed  to be equal  for all countries. 
The model establishes  that relative  changes  in money supply,  interest 
rate, and real income affect  the exchange  rate.  An increase  in the money 
supply at home leads to an equiproportionate  depreciation.  Because an 
increase  in domestic  real income  raises  the demand  for real  balances  and 
thus  leads  to a fall in domestic  prices,  it induces  an offsetting  exchange  ap- 
preciation.  Relatively  higher  domestic  interest  rates, by contrast,  reduce 
the demand  for real balances,  raise prices, and therefore  bring  about an 
exchange  depreciation. 
There  are  two ways  to test  the monetary  approach.  One  recognizes  that 
instantaneous  PPP is an essential  part of the monetary  approach  and 
directly  tests  whether  PPP prevails.  The second  examines  the explanatory 
power  of econometric  equations  specified  like equation  3. 
There  is ample  evidence  accumulating  that  this assumption  is not war- 
ranted.  Not only does the short-term  exchange  rate deviate  from a PPP 
path, but there are also cumulative  deviations  from that path that show 
substantial  persistence.  This  is clearly  brought  out by table 1, which  shows 
annual  inflation  rates  for consumer  prices  in the United States,  five other 
major  industrial  countries,  and a trade-weighted  index  of those countries. 
The table also shows the average  annual  appreciation  of the foreign  cur- 
rencies  relative  to the dollar,  bilaterally  and as a group.  Contrary  to PPP 
theory,  real exchange  rates  have not remained  constant.  The striking  fact 
is that  during  the period  from 1973 to 1979, the annual  rate  of inflation  in 
the United States averaged  about 1 percentage  point less than in the 
group  of foreign  countries,  yet the dollar has depreciated  at an average 
rate of over 1 percent  a year.4  There has thus been an average  annual 
4. The comparison  here is based on consumer  prices;  it holds, in general, for other 
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Table 1. Inflation  and Currency  Appreciation  in Major  Industrial  Countries,  1973-79 
Annual average,  in percent 
Measure 
Consumer  price  Appreciation  on 
Country  inflation  the dollar 
United States  8.5  ... 
Other  major  industrial  countriesa  9.4  1.4 
Canada  9.2  -2.6 
France  10.7  0.7 
Germany  4.6  6.4 
Japan  9.9  3.6 
United Kingdom  15.6  -2.4 
Source: International Monetary Fund, Interniational  Financial Statistcs, vol.  33 (March  1980), series 
ahx for exchange rates and series 64 for prices. 
a.  These series are weighted averages of the respective individual series for the five foreign countries. 
The relative weights are derived from the International Monetary Fund's multilateral trade model. They 
are:  Canada-0.2405,  France-0.1640,  Germany-0.2340,  Japan-O.2160,  and  the United  Kingdom- 
0.1440. 
change in relative price levels adjusted  for exchange rate movements 
(or a real depreciation  of the dollar) of more than 2 percentage  points. 
This substantial  rate of real depreciation  should attract attention  and 
study rather  than being confined to the error term. The evidence of 
table 1 is also reflected  in figure 1, which shows that the International 
Monetary  Fund's  multilateral  nominal  and real effective  exchange  rates 
of the dollar  have moved  together.  Figure  2 illustrates  how the nominal 
effective  exchange rate has departed  from, rather than simply offset, 
inflation  differentials.5 
The alternative  approach  to testing  the monetary  theory  relies  on evi- 
dence from regression  equations.  The empirical  evidence reported  in 
table 2 tests the explanatory  power of the theory as specified  by equa- 
tion 3, using the dollar-mark  exchange  rate. The explanatory  variables 
are relative nominal money supplies, relative real income levels, and 
nominal  long-term  and short-term  interest  differentials. 
The long-term  interest  differential  appears  in the exchange  rate equa- 
tion either because, in addition  to short-term  interest  rates, long-term 
rates  measure  one of the alternative  costs of holding  money or because 
they are taken  as a proxy  for anticipated  inflation  differentials.  In either 
5. Throughout  the remainder  of this paper the nominal effective exchange rate is 
this trade-weighted  index of  the five foreign countries of  table 1, rather than the 
Iiiternational  Monetary Fund's published multilateral  trade-weighted  index. 1.0~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
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view, a rise in the domestic  long-term  interest  rate differential  leads to a 
reduction  in real  money  demand  and thus to higher  prices and deprecia- 
tion.6 
The theory suggests  that a rise in domestic relative income induces 
appreciation  and that an increase  in domestic  interest  rates induces de- 
preciation.  Equation  2-1 in table 2 tests this theory  with quarterly  data, 
with coefficients  constrained  to be equal for all countries.  It offers  little 
support  for the monetary  approach.  Only a small  fraction  of the variance 
in the exchange  rate is explained,  and there is a high (0.88)  estimated 
coefficient  of serial  correlation.  Although  interest  rates  have the expected 
sign and are significantly  different  from zero, the coefficient  of relative 
monies  is actually  negative,  but  it is insignificant. 
The coefficient  of relative  monies in the remaining  equations  is con- 
strained  to unity.  Equations  2-2 and  2-3 differ  in sample  period  and  dem- 
onstrate  the instability  of equation  3. For the complete  sample  period  the 
equation has negligible explanatory  power. Equation 2-4  allows for 
lagged adjustment  in real balances  by introducing  the lagged dependent 
variable  as an explanatory  variable.7  Only the lagged adjustment  term 
appears  significant  in this  formulation. 
The evidence  on PPP and  the econometric  evidence  reported  here  leave 
little doubt  that the monetary  approach  in the form of equation  3 is an 
unsatisfactory  theory of exchange  rate determination.  The key link be- 
tween  the exchange  rate  and  PPP fails to hold, and any  reasonable  model 
must  include  a theory  of real exchange  rate  determination. 
The monetary  approach  was an important  stepping  stone of empirical 
research  in international  monetary  economics and a plausible,  if bold, 
hypothesis.  Together  with the asset market  approach,  it reflected  a reac- 
tion to elasticity  models of the exchange  rate and, in that respect,  was a 
substantial  contribution.  Both approaches  share the partial  equilibrium 
6. For further  discussion  of the roles of long-term  and short-term  interest  differen- 
tials, see Jeffrey  A. Frankel, "On the Mark: A Theory of Floating Exchange Rates 
Based on Real Interest  Differentials,"  American Economic Review, vol. 69 (Septem- 
ber 1979), pp. 610-22. 
7.  For further discussion see Rudiger Dornbusch, "Monetary Policy under Ex- 
change-Rate  Flexibility," in Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Managed Exchange 
Rate Flexibility: The Recent Experience, Conference Series, 20 (FRBB, 1979), pp. 
90-122; Frankel, "On  the Mark";  and P. Hooper and J. Morton, "Fluctuations  in the 
Dollar: A Model of Nominal and Real Exchange Rate Determination" (Board of 
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view that exchange  rates  are determined  by the conditions  of stock equi- 
librium  in the asset markets.  They ignore other factors important  to a 
general  equilibrium  analysis.  I turn  next to a broader  model that  reintro- 
duces the more traditional  aspects  of exchange  rate determination-the 
current  account,  wealth effects,  expectations,  and relative  prices. 
A  GENERAL  MODEL  OF  EXCHANGE  RATES 
If strict  PPP is abandoned,  the way is clear for a broad approach  to 
modeling  exchange  rate determination.  A first  step here is the traditional 
Mundell-Fleming  model that remains,  with some adaptations,  the back- 
bone  of macroeconomic  models  of the  exchange  rate.8  This  model  assumes 
that  domestic  prices  are  fixed  in each  home  currency  so that  the exchange 
rate sets the terms  of trade  or the price  of domestic  goods relative  to im- 
ports. Capital  is fully mobile internationally  and, with perfect  substitut- 
ability  between  home and foreign  securities  (ignoring  exchange  rate ex- 
pectations), interest rates  are  equalized internationally.  Output is 
demand-determined. 
Suppose,  in this setting,  that  monetary  expansion  occurs  at home. The 
resulting  decline  in interest  rates  leads  to an international  differential  that 
brings  about an incipient  capital  outflow.  The exchange  rate depreciates 
and, with elasticity  conditions  satisfied,  demand  shifts toward  domestic 
goods.  The  induced  increase  in output  leads  to a rise  in income  and  money 
demand  until equality  among  international  interest  rates  is restored  at a 
higher  level of output  with a lower real exchange  rate. 
An expansion  in demand  for home output  arising  from  fiscal  policy or 
an exogenous  shift in demand  leads to an increase  in income and money 
demand,  and hence a tendency  for interest  rates  to increase.  The induced 
capital  inflows  bring  about  exchange  rate  appreciation,  a loss in competi- 
tiveness,  and  hence  a deterioration  in the current  balance  that  dampens  or 
offsets  the expansion.  This result  is clearly  a curiosity,  and I return  to it 
below. 
An extended  Mundell-Fleming  model can be derived  by relaxing  five 
key restrictive  assumptions:  fixed prices, the fully demand-determined 
level of output,  the absence  of exchange  rate  expectations,  the absence  of 
a role for the current  account  in exchange  rate determination,  and the 
8. For an exposition and further  references,  see Rudiger  Dornbusch, Open Econ- 
omy Macroeconomics (Basic Books, forthcoming in 1980). Rudiger  Dornbusch  153 
perfect  substitutability  of domestic  and foreign  securities.  The first  three 
assumptions  are readily  relaxed.9 
Rational  expectations  and long-run  neoclassical  features  such as full 
employment  are included  in the extended  Mundell-Fleming  model. The 
increase  in demand  again  brings  an immediate  nominal  and real appre- 
ciation that restores  demand to the full employment  level through  an 
offsetting  deterioration  in the current  account,  and monetary  expansion 
leads to an immediate  depreciation  of the nominal and real exchange 
rate.  Moreover,  the exchange  rate must overshoot,  depreciating  propor- 
tionately  more  than  the expansion  in money,  if asset  markets  adjust  more 
rapidly  than goods markets.  The domestic  interest  rate falls relative  to 
those abroad,  and asset markets  will be in balance  only if the exchange 
rate  initially  overshoots,  so that there are corresponding  expectations  of 
currency  appreciation.10 
The extended  Mundell-Fleming  model  is a first  approach  to expanding 
exchange  rate  theory  in the absence  of PPP that allows  for short-run  real 
effects  of monetary  disturbances  and that permits  the possibility  of per- 
manent  changes  in relative  prices  in response  to changes  in the pattern  of 
world  demand.  By introducing  rational  expectations,  the  model  focuses  on 
"news"  as the determinant  of unanticipated  changes  in the exchange  rate. 
Over  time  the exchange  rate  follows a path  delineated  by interest  differen- 
tials. News about  monetary  developments  or the state of demand  bring 
about  immediate  changes  in the  level and  path  of the exchange  rate.  These 
ideas can be incorporated  by distinguishing  between actual and antici- 
9.  See Rudiger Dornbusch, "Expectations  and Exchange Rate Dynamics," Jour- 
nal of Political Economy, vol. 84 (December 1976), pp. 1161-76, and Open Econ- 
omy Macroeconomics. 
10. The model  is made up of the condition  of monetary  equilibrium, 
mr-p  =  ky -  hi; 
the  condition  of equalization  of interest  rates,  adjusted  for anticipated  depreciation,  6, 
i =  i* ?  ; 
and the condition  of equilibrium  in the goods market, 
y  =  a(e  -  p)  +  u, 
where  it is assumed,  for expository  simplicity,  that there is no direct effect of interest 
rates on aggregate  demand.  The rate of inflation (relative  to trend) is determined  by 
the output  gap,  y -  y;  that  is, 1 =  b(y -  y). The model determines  at a point in time the 
level of output  and the exchange  rate, as well as the rate of inflation  and depreciation, 
as a function  of prices.  Shifts in demand,  shown by shifts in u, lead to immediate  off- 
setting  changes  in the real exchange  rate. 154  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity, 1:1980 
pated  depreciation,  e' and  6, respectively.  With  perfect  asset  substitutabil- 
ity, the actual  rate  of depreciation  is the sum of anticipated  depreciation, 
which equals the nominal  interest  differential,  i  -  iX,  and the effect of 
news, which is given by the difference  between actual and anticipated 
depreciation, 
(4)  e'=(-  i*)+(e'  ). 
The relevant  news  in this model  is changes  in monetary  conditions  and  in 
the demand  for domestic  output. 
The model retains the uncomfortable  property  that any increase  in 
demand  for home output,  whether  through  fiscal  expansion  or increased 
net exports,  leads to nominal  and real appreciation  because  the only role 
of the current  account  is as a component  of demand.  Imbalances  in the 
current  account  have  no medium-term  feedback  on the economy,  either  in 
goods markets  or in asset markets.  The analysis  can now be expanded  to 
introduce  the role of the current  account. 
Suppose  that in the goods market  demand  for home output depends 
not only on income  and  the terms  of trade  but also on real  wealth.  A rise 
in real wealth  would be expected  to increase  real spending  and demand 
for domestic goods. A rise in wealth thus creates an excess demand, 
which,  to maintain  output  at full employment,  would  have to be offset  by 
the expenditure-shifting  effect of a real exchange  rate appreciation.  In 
the diagram  below the y schedule  is seen as the combination  of real ex- 
change rates-defined as the ratio of the price of imports  to domestic 
goods imports-and the level of real wealth,  w, which is consistent  with 
output  at full employment."1 
The current  account  is balanced  along  the schedule  w  0. With  more 
wealth there is increased  spending  and thus a tendency  for an external 
deficit.  To restore  external  balance,  the real exchange  rate must depre- 
ciate, thus shifting  demand  from  foreign  goods toward  home output,  and 
11. In terms of note 10, the equilibrium  condition in the goods market now be- 
comes y = J(e  -  p, w, u), where iv denotes the level of real wealth and a rise in real 
wealth increases  demand for home output. Real balances are excluded from the defi- 
riition  of real wealth. The current account is equal to the rate of change of real 
wealth, wi; that is,  ' =  H(e  -  p, w, y,  v),  where v is a shift parameter.  The current 
account improves with real depreciation  but deteriorates  with an increase in income 
or wealth as both induce increased  spending.  For a more complete model along these 
lines see Rudiger  Dornbusch and Stanley Fischer, "Exchange  Rates and the Current 
Account,"  American  Economic  Review  (forthcoming in December 1980). Rudiger  Dornbusch  155 
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thereby restoring external balance.  Accordingly,  the  external balance 
schedule is positively sloped; points above the schedule correspond to a 
surplus and points below to a deficit. Furthermore, a surplus implies net 
acquisition of  claims on  the rest of  the world and hence  growing real 
wealth; the converse is true for a deficit. 
The extended framework is helpful in identifying the long-run equilib- 
rium of the economy, its determinants, and some of the factors that affect 
the dynamics. The diagram shows that long-run equilibrium occurs for 
real variables-real  wealth and the terms of trade or real exchange rate. 
At point A,  demand for domestic output is at full employment and the 
current account is  in  equilibrium or,  equivalently,  income  equals  ex- 
penditure. In the background is the monetary sector that specifies the price 
level and the nominal exchange rate. 
The expanded model makes possible the immediate interpretation of a 
demand shift or increase in net exports. With a permanent increase in net 
exports there is an excess demand for domestic goods and an equal sur- 
plus. To restore internal and external balance simultaneously, all that is 
required  is nominal and real appreciation. A demand shift thus leads to an 156  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity, 1:1980 
instantaneous real and nominal appreciation to a point like A', with no 
further adjustments needed. By contrast, a rise in spending on both home 
and traded goods  in the pattern of  average expenditures will leave  the 
equilibrium composition of spending unchanged, and thus only leads to a 
change in long-run wealth at point A". Over time the economy will reduce 
its stock of assets until spending has declined sufficiently  for the initial real 
exchange rate to  be reestablished. The adjustment process depends, of 
course, on the interaction between goods markets and the monetary sector. 
The uncomfortable fact remains that even in this model there is a short- 
run tendency for  an  expenditure increase to induce  appreciation. The 
reason is, once again, that the increase in demand leads to a rise in income 
and thus to higher money demand and increased interest rates. Because 
the long-run real and nominal exchange rate are unchanged, higher inter- 
est rates are only compatible with equilibrium in the international capital 
market if there is the expectation of depreciating currency. That expecta- 
tion will arise through an initial real and nominal appreciation. Thus in 
the diagram above the real exchange rate would appreciate in the short 
run to a point like A'. Over time, as the stock of assets is reduced through 
the current account deficit and demand falls, the real exchange rate de- 
preciates until point A" is reached. An immediate appreciation is again 
implied when the dynamics are governed by short-run price stickiness and 
rational expectations in asset markets. 
Expansionary fiscal policy will only lead to an initial depreciation of 
the nominal and real exchange rate if, in addition to the expectation of an 
unchanged long-run real exchange rate, the expectation of a nominal de- 
preciation is introduced. There is good reason for such an assumption if 
one considers a fiscal expansion as one that is accommodated by an ex- 
pansion in nominal money so that the nominal interest rate is unchanged. 
And it is the only way to generate this result in the model. With an ac- 
commodating nominal money expansion, the expectation of a higher long- 
run level of prices with unchanged terms of trade leads to an immediate 
depreciation of the real exchange rate to a point like A* in the diagram. 
At A *, assuming smooth adjustment, there is a current account deficit 
(the  wi  =  0 locus shifts leftward, as does the y schedule)  combined with 
an output expansion. From A*  the economy moves toward A"; wealth 
declines,  and the  real  exchange  rate  appreciates to  restore the  initial 
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The final  exercise  to be considered  is a sustained  increase  in the rate  of 
money  creation.  The expectation  of higher  long-run  inflation,  and of the 
induced  increase  in velocity,  implies  a one-time  rise  in the cost of foreign 
currency.  With rational  expectations,  the currency  immediately  depre- 
ciates  before  prices  rise and  the economy  moves  to a point like A * in the 
diagram.  But because  in the long run the real exchange  rate and real 
wealth  are  unchanged,  and  because  the  real  depreciation  induces  a current 
account surplus at A *  (this time the schedules remain the same), a 
clockwise  adjustment  occurs  until the economy  returns  to point A. Out- 
put is initially above full employment  in the adjustment  process as a 
consequence  of the overdepreciation;  assets are accumulated  through 
the current  account;  and the real exchange  rate appreciates.  The current 
account  surplus  and  the income  expansion  are,  of course,  only transitory, 
as is the real  depreciation. 
I have described  a fairly eclectic general  equilibrium  model of goods 
markets  and  asset  markets  expectations,  and  current  account  adjustment. 
The model  is capable  of accounting  for some of the exchange  rate  experi- 
ence  in the United  States,  in particular  the transitory  deviations  from  PPP, 
permanent  changes  in the real exchange  rate,  and  jumps  of exchange  rates 
in response  to new information.  This latter  phenomenon  is a key feature 
of the model  and  implies  that,  because  of the differential  speed  of adjust- 
ment  in goods markets  and asset markets,  even purely  monetary  distur- 
bances  have transitory  real effects. 
TESTING  THE  NEWS 
In this section  I offer  some tests of the exchange  rate  model developed 
above.  I showed  there  that  unanticipated  changes  in aggregate  demand  or 
in net exports  affect  the equilibrium  exchange  rate. In particular,  an ac- 
commodated  increase in demand leads to depreciation  and a current 
account  deficit;  an unanticipated  increase  in net exports  leads to an ap- 
preciation.  A monetary  expansion  induces  depreciation,  income growth, 
and a transitory  current  account  surplus. 
Perhaps  the central  implication  of the rational  expectations  model is 
that it must be tested in "news form." With the assumption  that asset 
markets  are  efficient,  all available  information  is immediately  embodied  in 
asset  prices  and  exchange  rates.  If one disregards  for now  the  possibility  of 158  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity, 1:1980 
a risk premium,  deviations  of exchange  rates from the path implied  by 
interest  differentials  are  thus  entirely  due  to news.12 
The extended  model  first  distinguishes  news  of three  kinds  as important 
determinants  of unanticipated  changes  in exchange  rates:  news about  the 
current  account,  cyclical  or demand  factors,  and  interest  rates.  To test this 
model empirically,  I use the definition  of unanticipated  depreciation  as 
the difference  between  the actual  depreciation  and interest  differentials, 
'-  (i-  i*).  The theory  suggests  that an unanticipated  surplus  in the 
current  account  leads to appreciation,  while an unanticipated  increase 
in demand  that is accommodated  will lead to depreciation.  Denoting 
news about the current  account, cyclical movements,  and interest  rates 
as CAE, CYC, and  INN, respectively,  the equation  becomes 
(5)  e'  -  (i  -  i)  =  o  -  aiCAE  +  a2CYC  -  a3CYC* +  a4INN, 
where  in the absence  of a risk  premium,  a,0  is expected  to be zero. 
As measures  of the current  account  and cyclical  news I use the official 
forecast  errors  of the Organisation  for Economic Co-operation  and De- 
velopment,  which  publishes  biannual  six-month  forecasts  for current  ac- 
count balances and real growth of major industrial  countries.13  Com- 
bined with the subsequently  realized current account balances and 
growth  rates,  these forecasts  yield time series  data  for the news shown  in 
the explanatory  variables.  Because these forecasts  are prepared  through 
multilateral  intergovernmental  consultation,  they are  broadly  representa- 
tive of informed  opinion about  growth  and current  account  balances. 
Consider next the unanticipated depreciation, e'  -  (i  -  i*),  for the 
nominal  effective  exchange  rate of the dollar (defined  in table 1). The 
12. The idea of  testing rational expectations models in news form is familiar 
from the work of Robert J. Barro in macroeconomics. In the context of exchange 
rate problems the idea is rapidly becoming accepted. See in particular Dornbusch, 
"Monetary Policy"; Peter Isard, "Expected and Unexpected Changes in  Interest 
Rates,"  International  Finance Discussion Paper 145 (Board of Governors  of the Fed- 
eral Reserve  System, June 1979); Michael P. Dooley and Peter Isard, "The  Portfolio- 
Balance Model of  Exchange Rates," International Finance Discussion Paper 141 
(Board of  Governors of the Federal Reserve System, May 1979); extensive work 
by Michael Mussa, in particular  his "Empirical  Regularities in the Behavior of Ex- 
change Rates and Theories of the Foreign Exchange Market,"  in Karl Brunner  and 
Allan H. Meltzer, Policies for Employment, Prices, and Exchange Rates, Carnegie- 
Rochester  Conference Series on Public Policy, vol. 11 (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 
1979), pp. 9-57, as well as references  given there. 
13. See Organisation  for Economic Co-operation  and Development, OECD Eco- 
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monthly  series  is shown in figure  3, together  with the series for antici- 
pated  depreciation  given  by i -  i* (both expressed  as annual  percentage 
rates). As the figure  clearly  illustrates,  unanticipated  changes  constitute 
nearly  all the actual  variation  in exchange  rates. 
Regression  equations  explaining  unanticipated  depreciation  of the dol- 
lar against  a trade-weighted  mixture  of other currencies  are shown in 
table 3. Equation  3-1 explains  the unanticipated  depreciation  of the dol- 
lar by the current  account  and cyclical  errors.  The cyclical  errors  for the 
United States and five foreign  countries  are constrained  to be of equal 
and opposite  sign in this equation.  The equation  accounts  for much of 
the unanticipated  depreciation,  and evidence of serial correlation  does 
not appear  in the errors.  The coefficients  do have the expected  signs.  The 
coefficient  on the current  account  news is significant.  An unanticipated 
current  account  surplus  in the United States  of $1 billion is worth  half a 
percent of appreciation.  The coefficient  on the cyclical forecast error 
indicates  that unanticipated  growth  leads to depreciation.  But it is not 
significantly  different  from  zero. Perhaps  this reflects  the fiscal  expansion 
phenomenon  discussed  above. 
Equations  3-2 and 3-3 include  unanticipated  changes  in interest  rates. 
Ideally  the term  structure  of interest  rates  should  be used to measure  in- 
novations;  but here, because of the complexity  of deriving  such series, 
residuals  from an autoregression  of the short-term  interest differential 
have  been  used.  The equations  show  that  unanticipated  increases  in short- 
term  interest  differentials  appear  with a positive  coefficient  that  is signifi- 
cant. The interest  differential  may reflect  a causal  role for unanticipated 
changes  in the term structure,  inflation  news, or cyclical effects as sug- 
gested  by a comparison  of equations  3-1 and 3-2 in the table.14 
Table  4 presents  similar  equations  for the dollar-mark  and dollar-yen 
exchange  rates.  Consider  first  the case of Japan.  Equation  4-1 shows  quite 
strikingly  the role of current  account  errors  and cyclical errors.  An un- 
anticipated  surplus  in the Japanese  current  account  leads to dollar  depre- 
ciation  or yen appreciation.  A cyclical  expansion  in Japan  induces  a yen 
depreciation.  Both the coefficients  of CAE and  CYC are significantly  dif- 
14. Frenkel reports regressions of the level of the exchange rate on lagged for- 
ward rates, interest differentials,  and interest innovations, the last appearing  with a 
positive coefficient.  He attributes  the positive coefficient  to inflation  news. See Jacob 
A. Frenkel, "Flexible  Exchange Rates in the 1970's,"  Working Paper 450 (National 
Bureau of Economic Research, 1980), pp. 34-37. In my equations the introduction 
of inflation  news yields a negative, insignificant  coefficient. 0  D  0 
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ferent from zero. The equation explains a large portion of the unantici- 
pated depreciation. Unlike equation 3-3 for the United States in table 3, 
the constant terms are not significantly different  from zero. 
Equations 4-2  and 4-3 include interest rate news. The innovations in 
equation 4-2  are from an autoregression of  the interest differential. In 
equation 4-3 the interest variable is residuals from an interest differential 
equation. The roles of the two interest rate innovations are quite different. 
The former have a significant positive coefficient reducing the magnitude 
and significance of the cyclical effects; the latter, which are more nearly 
orthogonal to cyclical effects, appear with a negative and insignificant co- 
efficient.  The same pattern is observed in the equations for Germany. 
Unlike the dollar-yen exchange rate, unanticipated movements in the 
dollar-mark rate are not dominated by news about cyclical or current ac- 
count  events.  Unanticipated  improvements in  the  current account  of 
Germany lead to a dollar depreciation, but the coefficient on the current 
account and cyclical innovations variables are not significantly different 
from zero. Innovations from an autoregression of interest differentials do 
play a part in explaining exchange rate movements in equation 4-4. But in 
4-6  the residuals from a reaction function for the interest differential, 
which is discussed below, turn out to be insignificant. I argue there that 
portfolio shifts may well be the explanation for these results. 
The empirical analysis confirms that unanticipated real and financial 
disturbances  bring about unexpected movements in the exchange rate. To 
that extent, the preceding theory is confirmed. Whether the size of ex- 
change rate movements stands in reasonable relation to the disturbance 
remains an open question. Clearly the answer depends not only on the 
structural  parameters,  including trade elasticities, but also on the expected 
persistence of the disturbance. The more persistent the disturbance, other 
things being equal, the larger the required change in the real exchange 
rate. 
PORTFOLIO  DIVERSIFICATION  AND  THE 
DEUTSCHE  MARK  SHORTAGE 
The analysis so far has largely excluded portfolio balance and its im- 
plications for exchange rates. The models considered share the assumption 
of perfect substitutability  of home and foreign securities on a depreciation- 
adjusted basis, thus leaving no room for shifts in wealth or relative asset 
supplies to affect the balance in asset markets. I now depart from this as- 164  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1980 
sumption to see what insights a broader treatment of portfolio choice will 
yield. 
A starting  point is the hypothesis that money demand depends not only 
on income, the conventional transactions variable, but  also on wealth. 
Shifts in wealth induced by  current account imbalances  create mone- 
tary imbalances leading to adjustments  in long-run price level expectations 
and thus to exchange rate movements. This effect does not presuppose 
imperfect asset substitutability, although it is entirely compatible with it. 
With perfect mobility of capital, this specification of money demand im- 
plies that the real money demand of a country with a surplus rises while 
it falls abroad. The relative price level of the country with a surplus de- 
clines  and, therefore, exchange rates for given terms of  trade tend to 
appreciate.15 
The results, of course, follow from a strong assumption about distribu- 
tion effects. Monies are treated as nontraded assets, the demand for which 
is affected by an international redistribution of wealth. In the absence of 
an empirically significant wealth  effect on money  demand, this theory 
probably does not go very far in explaining exchange rates. 
An alternative and more persuasive role for portfolio effects arises in 
the context of imperfect asset substitutability. With uncertain real returns, 
portfolio diversification makes assets imperfect substitutes and gives rise 
to  determinate demands for the  respective securities and to  real yield 
differentials or a risk premium.'6 
15. This variant of the current account theory of exchange rates is emphasized 
in Rudiger Dornbusch, "Capital  Mobility, Flexible Exchange Rates and Macroeco- 
nomic Equilibrium,"  in E. Claassen and P. Salin, eds., Recent Isslues in International 
Monetary  Economics, Studies in Monetary Economies, vol. 2 (Amsterdam: North- 
Holland, 1976),  pp. 261-78; and Pentti J. K. Kouri, "The Exchange Rate and the 
Balance of Payments  in the Short Run and in the Long Run: A Monetary  Approach," 
Scandinavian  Journal  of Economiiics, vol.  78,  no.  2 (1976),  pp. 280-304. 
16. This line of research  has been particularly  pursued in W. H. Branson, "Asset 
Markets and Relative Prices in Exchange Rate Determination,"  Sozialwissenschaft- 
liche Annalen,  vol. 1 (1977),  pp. 69-89; and William H. Branson,  Hannu Halttunen, 
and Paul Masson, "Exchange Rates in the Short Run: The Dollar-Deutschemark 
Rate," European  Economic  Review, vol. 10 (December 1977), pp. 303-24. See also 
Michael G. Porter, "Exchange  Rates, Current  Accounts and Economic Activity-A 
Survey of  Some Theoretical and Empirical Issues" (Board of  Governors of  the 
Federal Reserve System, June 1979); Dooley and Isard, "Portfolio-Balance  Model"; 
Maurice Obstfeld, "Capital  Mobility and Monetary Policy under Fixed and Flexible 
Exchange Rates" (Ph.D. dissertation,  Massachusetts  Institute  of Technology, 1979); 
Pentti J. K. Kouri and Jorge Braga de Macedo, "Exchange Rates and the Inter- Rudiger Dornbusch  165 
The portfolio model provides an explanation of the unanticipated mark 
appreciation that is only poorly accounted for by the current account and 
cyclical innovations. I argue that the systein of  flexible exchange rates 
and the macroeconomic policies and disturbances have created an incen- 
tive for portfolio diversification, that the mark would occupy a large share 
in an efficiently diversified portfolio, and that the resulting portfolio shifts 
or capital flows account for some of the unanticipated appreciation. 
Table 5 shows the realized means and variances of the real returns on 
assets denominated in different currencies. The real yield in each instance 
is the nominal short-term interest rate plus the depreciation of the dollar 
relative to the particular currency, thus creating dollar returns, less the 
rate of inflation of the dollar price index of manufactures in world trade. 
The real return data thus are comparable and appropriate for an investor 
that does not have a particular local habitat. 
Concentrating  on the 1976-79  period, note that both the mark and the 
dollar are relatively stable (low-variance)  assets and that their returns are 
negatively correlated. The dollar has a negative mean return, while the 
mark has a positive one. 
In principle, an efficiently diversified portfolio is a wide-ranging one, 
including bonds, amusement parks, old-age homes,  and so on. In prac- 
tice, investors develop a narrow portfolio, highly concentrated in home 
securities with a small range of international claims. Suppose, to make a 
point, that only dollars and marks are part of the portfolio of international 
assets. What would  be  their respective shares? The  relevant model  of 
utility-maximizing portfolio diversification shows that the share of mark 
assets, using the distribution of returns oL  table 5, is 56 percent. This cor- 
responds to a 50 percent share of bonds denominated in marks in the 
minimum-variance  portfolio plus a 6 percent share in a speculative mark 
position.17  The speculative position in marks, motivated by the differen- 
national Adjustment  Process,"  BPEA, 1:1978, pp. 111-50; and Rudiger Dornbusch, 
"A Portfolio Balance Model of  the Open Economy," Jouirnal  of  Monetary Eco- 
nomics, vol. 1 (January 1975), pp. 3-20. 
17. Let w be the initial  level of real  wealth;  r and r*, the random  real  returns  on home 
and foreign  securities;  and x, the portfolio share of foreign securities.  End-of-period 
wealth  then  is random  and equal  to w =  w(l +  r) +  xw(r* -  r). Utility  is a function  of 
the mean  and variance  of end-of-period  wealth: 
U  =  U(w,  sD  . 
The mean  and variance  of wealth  are defined  as C  Zi~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~' 
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tial in mean  real  yields,  is quite  small  because  of the large  variance  of the 
nominal  rate  of depreciation  that  makes  speculation  risky.  The share  in the 
minimum  variance  portfolio  is substantial,  though,  because the mark  is 
an attractive  asset-it  has a relatively  low variance  of the real yield and 
a negative covariance  with the dollar. The exercise, while merely an 
illustration,  does suggest that the mark has characteristics  that should 
make  it play a large  role in portfolios,  and  indeed,  an even greater  role as 
an  international  asset  than  was  the  case  in the 1960s  or early  1970s. 
The argument  may overstate  the case in a number  of ways. First, the 
realized  returns  may  not equal  the  return  distribution  that  investors  antici- 
pate. This is even more true if much of the differential  in mean real re- 
turns  reflects  unanticipated  mark  appreciation.18  Second,  other  currencies 
may  enter  the portfolio,  some with features  more attractive  than  those of 
the mark.  Third,  international  differences  in consumption  patterns  may 
bias the portfolio  shares  away  from  those implied  by the return  distribu- 
tion of table 5. Each of these arguments  has some force, although  none 
w =  w(l +  r) + xw(r* -  r);  s,  =  w[(  -  x)2s  +  x2s,*  +  2x(1 -x)s,*], 
where  a bar denotes a mean. Maximizing  utility with respect to x yields the optimal 
portfolio  share, 
( r* -  r)  +  O(Sr  -  Srr*) 
where  0 _  U2w/Ul  is the coefficient  of relative  risk aversion,  Srr* is the covariance  of 
real returns,  and 
S2  -  S2  +  S2*  -  2Srr* 
is the variance  of the nominal  rate of depreciation.  The first term, (r -_  *)/6s2, corre- 
sponds  to the speculative  portfolio  share in marks  and depends  on the mean real yield 
differential  and the variance  of the nominal  rate of depreciation.  The second  term  repre- 
sents the hedging, or minimum-variance,  portfolio that depends only on variances. 
For further  discussion,  see Rudiger Dornbusch, "Exchange  Risk and the Macroeco- 
nomics  of Exchange  Rate Determination"  (Massachusetts  Institute  of Technology,  April 
1980),  and the references  cited there. 
18. Table 5 cannot strictly be used to establish the case for diversification  since 
the data  reflect  both the "fundamentals"  and the effect of the alleged portfolio diversi- 
fication.  To the extent that the incidence of the latter was unanticipated,  the reported 
means and variance are not those the asset holders had in mind and accordingly 
cannot  be used to establish  the case for portfolio diversification.  In a short time-series 
for the flexible exchange rate system there is no  apparent way of  extracting the 
fundamentals,  nor is it possible to tell how serious the discrepancy  has been between 
previous beliefs and ex post returns. 168  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity, 1:1980 
of them necessarily  suggests a lower mark share in an international 
portfolio."' 
The main  point is simply  that the transition  to flexible  rates  has quite 
decisively  changed  the structure  of real returns  confronting  international 
investors-central banks,  firms,  or households.  With  the new return  struc- 
ture,  and  by virtue  of size, the mark  should  occupy  a large  share  of port- 
folios, much larger  than would have been expected  in 1970-73, before 
the period  of flexible  exchange  rates.  Investors  can be expected  to make 
a gradual  transition  to the new diversification  pattern.  But, as the poorly 
understood  process  of substitution  from  M1  to negotiable-orders-of-with- 
drawal  (NOW) accounts  and money-market  funds in the United States 
suggests,  little  is known  about  the dynamics  of portfolio  adjustment. 
As the substitution  process  takes  place,  the  mark  will tend  to appreciate 
unless there is an offsetting  increase  in the relative  supply  of assets de- 
nominated  in marks.  Such an increase  could be created  through  deficit 
finance, arising  from sterilized  exchange  rate intervention,  or take the 
form  of Carter  bonds (bonds  issued  by the U.S. government  denominated 
in marks).  In fact, as I show  below, there  has been a large  increase  in the 
relative  supply  of these  assets  because  of larger  German  deficits.  Sterilized 
intervention  has made  up a further  part  of the increased  demand.  The re- 
mainder  has been met by appreciation  of the mark,  revaluing  the share  of 
marks  already  existing  in international  portfolios. 
A first implication  of the portfolio model then is to help identify a 
shortage  of marks.  The adjustment  process  to the new role of the mark 
as an international  asset has brought  about a curious  reversal  of the old 
intermediation  view of the U.S. balance  of payments.  Germany  has been 
showing  a sustained  short-term  capital  account  surplus  with a direct  in- 
vestment  and portfolio  investment  deficit.  Germany  displays  the pattern 
typical of the United States when the dollar took an increasing  role in 
international  portfolios  after  the restoration  of currency  convertibility  in 
the late 1950s. 
19. Kouri and Macedo found an optimal mark share of 37 percent in a multiple- 
currency portfolio with local habitats. See their "Exchange Rates and the Interna- 
tional Adjustment Process," p. 129. See, too, the analysis in William Fellner, "The 
Bearing  of Risk Aversion on Movements of Spot and Forward Exchange Relative to 
the Dollar," in John S. Chipman and Charles P. Kindleberger,  eds., Flexible Ex- 
change Rates and the Balance of Payments: Essays in Memory of Egon Sohmen 
(Amsterdam: North-Holland, forthcoming). Rudiger  Dornbusch  169 
RELATIVE  ASSET  SUPPLIES,  WEALTH, 
AND  EXCHANGE  RATES 
I now explore  the portfolio  model  further  to see whether  there  are  im- 
plications  that  reinforce  or put  in question  the  conjecture  discussed  above: 
that for given asset supplies  and wealth  the structure  of real returns  im- 
plies a shift in portfolios  toward  assets denominated  in marks,  thus ex- 
plaining  the  persistent  appreciation  of the mark. 
The portfolio-diversification  model implies  a relationship  between  the 
nominal  interest  differcntial,  the expected  rate of depreciation,  and the 
risk premium,  R: 
(6)  i  =  i-i*  +  R  EV*_ 
where 
E =  level of domestic  currency  price  of foreign  exchange 
W =  level of wealth 
V =  supply of nominal debt. 
The risk premium  in equation  6 is an increasing  function  of the relative 
supply  of assets  denominated  in foreign  currency,  EV*/ (V + EV*), and 
a decreasing  function  of foreign  relative  wealth.20  What matters  for the 
risk premium  are the relative supplies of outside bonds (net assets of 
the private  sector) denominated  in the two currencies,  independently  of 
the issuing  source.21  Risk is here a question  of the variability  of real re- 
turns due to uncertain  inflation  and exchange  rate depreciation,  not a 
20. The risk premium  can be written  as 
R  s 
[nV  +-EV* 
-  -s( 
-  *)  W +  W* 
where V is  domestic currency outside bonds, and W is domestic nominal wealth; 
s2 and S2 are the variances  of the rates of nominal and real depreciation;  0 is the co- 
efficient  of relative  risk aversion;  -  O* >  0 equals the difference  between domestic 
and foreign expenditure  shares of domestic goods; and ,3 is the minimum-variance 
portfolio  share  defined  in note 17. For a derivation,  see Dornbusch,  "Exchange  Risk." 
21. Frankel and Kouri emphasized  that the risk premium involves outside assets 
independent  of the issuer. See Jeffrey  A. Frankel, "The Diversifiability  of Exchange 
Risk," Journal  of International  Economics, vol. 9 (August 1979), pp. 379-93; and 
Pentti J. K. Kouri, "The  Determinants  of the Forward Premium,"  Seminar Paper 62 
(University of  Stockholm, Institute for  International Economic Studies, August 
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question  of default.  Note also that the relative  wealth  term  will give rise 
to a risk premium  only to the extent that there are differences  in con- 
sumption  patterns  and that there  is variability  in the real exchange  rate. 
Suppose  now that interest  rates and anticipated  rates of depreciation 
are  given,  perhaps  determined  by, the monetary  sector  of the  more  general 
model. The risk-premium  model has implications  for the relationships 
among  wealth, asset supplies,  and the exchange  rate. In particular,  the 
model implies that an increase in foreign relative wealth, say arising 
through  a cumulative  foreign  current  account  surplus,  will bring  a relative 
increase  in the demand  for securities  denominated  in foreign currency. 
The  resulting  disequilibrium  in the asset  market  is resolved  by an apprecia- 
tion of the foreign currency  that revalues existing stocks of securities 
denominated  in foreign  currency.  This must be an unanticipated  wealth 
redistribution;  otherwise,  speculators  would  have anticipated  the jump  in 
the exchange  rate. 
Unanticipated  changes  in the relative  supplies  of securities  likewise  af- 
fect the exchange  rate. For example,  an unanticipated  fiscal deficit  that 
expands  the supply  of bonds denominated  in foreign  currency  leads to a 
depreciation  of the foreign  currency,  which  restores  portfolio  balance  at 
unchanged  yields. (In general,  exchange  rates  and asset  yields are  jointly 
determined.) 
The risk-premium  model  has served  as the basis  for extensive  research 
attempting  to explain exchange  rate movements  by changes  in relative 
wealth  (using  changes  in net  foreign  assets  as a proxy) and  in relative  asset 
supplies.22 
The model has had mixed  results  in empirical  tests,  largely  because  of 
the difficulty  in developing  measures  of relative  nominal  outside  assets  and 
relative  nominal  wealth.  Part of the problem  may also have been the use 
of actual  versus  unanticipated  variables.  Given  these  difficulties,  the exist- 
ing results  must  be considered  very tentative.  Even so, the risk-premium 
model is of interest  because  it offers,  through  the wealth  channel,  a role 
for the current  account  to affect  exchange  rates. At the same time, this 
22. Early work, in particular  Branson, Halttunen, and Masson, "Exchange  Rates 
in the Short Run," gave particular  emphasis to the current  account, taking wealth to 
be represented  by the cumulative current account. A more balanced treatment  that 
recognizes the central role of asset supplies, as opposed to the distribution  effects in- 
duced by current  account imbalances, is found in Obstfeld, "Capital  Mobility,"  and 
John P. Martin  and Paul R. Masson, "Exchange  Rates and Portfolio Balance,"  Work- 
ing Paper 377 (National Bureau of Economic Research,  August 1979). Rudiger Dornbusch  171 
Table 6. Current  Account  Balances  and  Net Borrowing  in Germany,  and  Ratios of 
German  to U.S. Debt, 1973-79 
Billions  of deutsche  marks,  except as noted 
Item  1973  1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979 
Current  account  balance  12.3  25.5  8.5  8.6  9.8  17.6  -9.0 
Net government  borrowing  6.1  10.8  36.4  20.0  21.7  27.4  25.1 
Ratio of German  to U.S. 
government  debt  (percent) 
Measured  in dollars  6.7  8.5  9.5  10.7  12.7  15.7  17.8 
Measured  in respective 
currencies  18.0  20.5  24.8  25.4  26.6  28.7  30.8 
Sources:  Government debt  and  borrowing-International  Monetary  Fund,  International Financial 
Statistics, vol. 33 (May 1980), series ae, series 84 and 88, and series 88, pp. 164, 166, and 404, respectively; 
and  current  account  balances-Deutsche  Buwdesbank,  Monthly  Report  of the  Deutschle Bunidesbank, vol.  32 
(March 1980), p. 70. 
model introduces  a potential  link between  deficit  finance  and exchange 
rates through  the relative  supply of assets. It thus supplements  the ex- 
tended  Mundell-Fleming  model and offers alternative  channels  through 
which  current  account  and  fiscal  innovations  can affect  the exchange  rate. 
Indeed,  the equations  reported  in tables 3 and 4 may well reflect  in part 
the effects  of the risk-premium  model. 
MARK APPRECIATION 
The risk-premium  model may help explain  the mark appreciation  of 
recent  years.  In table  6, I report  the German  current  account  balance,  net 
public sector  borrowing,  and the ratio of German  to U.S. debt (valued 
both  in dollars  and  in the respective  currencies).  The first  point  to note is 
that since 1975 the current  account  has been entirely  dominated  by the 
fiscal  deficit.  The demand  for mark  assets  created  by the redistribution  of 
wealth  toward  Germany  through  the current  account  must  have  been met 
quite  amply  by the deficit  finance.  The German  debt  has increased  much 
more  rapidly  than  that  of the United  States.  Thus  if a risk-premium  view 
were  taken,  one  would  expect  the mark  to show  a cumulative  depreciation, 
not an appreciation. 
The risk-premium  model suggests  that a demand  shift toward  assets 
denominated  in marks  has dominated  the downward  pressure  on the ex- 
change  rate arising  from the combination  of changes  in relative  wealth 
and the relative supplies of mark assets. Given the attempt  to attain 172  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity, 1:1980 
optimal  diversification,  the mark  was appreciating  because  of an insuffi- 
cient creation  of mark  assets.23 
The  risk-premium  model  has  one further  implication  that  has relevance 
for the equations  in tables 3 and 4. The existence  of a risk  premium  im- 
plies that not all the difference  between  interest  differentials  and actual 
depreciation  is unanticipated;  part corresponds  to the risk premium  and 
only the residual  represents  news. Thus equation  4 becomes 
(7)  e-ii*)-=(e'  -e)  +  R, 
=  news +  risk premium. 
The risk  premium  accordingly  can account  for a significant  constant  or  for 
serial  correlation  in the equations  above.24 
The Flexible Exchange  Rate System 
I now examine  some key features  of the system of flexible  exchange 
rates  to form  a  judgment  about  its shortcomings  and  the  possibilities  for  re- 
form.  Has the system  been critically  defective?  In this  section  I investigate 
some firmly  established  working  characteristics  of the system,  including 
intervention,  interest  rate  policies,  current  account  adjustment,  and  current 
account  financing.  The issues are  whether  intervention  policies  have  been 
designed  to frustrate  real exchange  rate adjustment;  whether  interest  rate 
policies were significantly  restricted  by actual  or potential  exchange  rate 
developments;  and finally, whether current account imbalances  have 
been sustained  and officially  funded rather  than adjusted  and financed 
through  capital  flows.25 
23. The data in table 6 understate  the increase in these assets because they omit 
items such as Carter  bonds or debt created  through sterilized intervention. 
24.  Cumby and Obstfeld do find evidence of a risk premium in weekly data for 
all major currencies.  See Robert E. Cumby and Maurice Obstfeld, "Exchange-Rate 
Expectations and Nominal Interest Differentials: A Test of the Fisher Hypothesis," 
Discussion Paper 34 (Columbia University, Department  of Economics, July 1979). 
25.  For an extensive discussion see the papers by Jacques R. Artus and John H. 
Young, "Fixed and Flexible Exchange Rates: A Renewal of the Debate," IMF Staff 
Papers, vol.  26  (December  1979),  pp. 654-98;  Morris Goldstein, Have Flexible 
Exchange Rates Handicapped Macroeconomic Policy? Special Papers in Interna- 
tional Economics, 14  (Princeton University, International Finance Section, June 
1980); and Steven W. Kohlhagen, "The Experience with Floating: The 1973-1979 
Dollar" (University  of California  at Berkeley,  n.d.). Rudiger  Dornbusch  173 
I show  that  the capital  mobility  problem  is summarized  by the observa- 
tion  that  when  the current  account  gets  bad  the capital  account  gets  worse. 
The reason is that interest rate policies are oriented toward internal 
balance,  which aggravates  the exchange  rate consequences  of cyclically 
unsynchronized  movements  in economic  activity  in the world economy. 
OFFICIAL  INTERVENTION 
The  reported  changes  in official  reserve  holdings  have  increased  sharply 
during  the 1970s.  Have  intervention  policies  had  systematically  stabilizing 
characteristics? 
Figure  4 shows an adjusted  series  for changes  in U.S. net liabilities  to 
foreign  official  reserve  agencies.  The figure  indicates  sizable  swings  in in- 
tervention,  which  were  larger  than  the swings  in the U.S. current  account. 
I present  equations  on the determinants  of intervention  in table 7. Given 
the size  of reserve  holdings  and  the level of nominal  interest  rates,  much  of 
the reported  increase  reflects  the accrual  of interest  earnings  rather  than 
active  market  intervention.  I thus  use as a dependent  variable  an adjusted 
series  that  subtracts  from  changes  in reserves  an amount  equal  to the U.S. 
Treasury  bill rate times the lagged  stock of reserves.  This series is mea- 
sured  as a fraction  of lagged  reserves.  Equations  7-1 and 7-2 use unan- 
ticipated  depreciation  rates to explain  U.S. net liabilities  to foreign  offi- 
cial holders.  With  a policy of "leaning  against  the wind,"  foreign  central 
banks  would acquire  dollars through  intervention  whenever  the dollar 
showed  unanticipated  depreciation.  The equations  strongly  support  that 
view, although  only a small  fraction  of the variance  is explained. 
Equation  7-2 suggests  that unanticipated  depreciation  of 1.0 percent- 
age point (at an annual  rate) leads to a cumulative  intervention  of 0.4 
percent  of foreign  net claims  on the United  States,  which  at current  levels 
of foreign  net reserve  holdings  is about $600 million.  The constant  term 
of 1.0 suggests  that  the absolute  size of intervention  is growing  along  with 
nominal  reserve  holdings. 
Equation  7-3 considers  German  intervention  policy.  There  is more  evi- 
dence of leaning against the wind. Unanticipated  depreciation  of  1 
percentage  point, at an annual  rate, leads to an intervention  at 1979 re- 
serve  levels of about  $140 million.  Interestingly,  macroeconomic  condi- 
tions affect  the level of German  intervention.  A high rate of unemploy- 06  0 
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ment  increases  the rate  of intervention,  while  high  inflation  reduces  inter- 
vention.  With more unemployment,  authorities  use intervention  to slow 
down real dollar  depreciation  to achieve  a "beggar-my-neighbor"  effect. 
With faster inflation,  unanticipated  dollar depreciation  is opposed less 
strongly  in order  to achieve  a reduction  in inflationary  pressure  or to avoid 
imported  inflation.  The coefficients  on the cyclical variables  suggest a 
policy that goes significantly  beyond  leaning  against  the wind.26  I found 
no evidence  of real  exchange  rate  targets. 
Equations  of the form reported  in table 7, which use unanticipated 
depreciation  to explain  reserves  adjusted  for interest  earnings,  are more 
successful  than actual  reserve  changes  and actual  depreciation.  This can 
be interpreted  to mean  that nominal  interest  payments  roughly  maintain 
the stock of real reserves  in the face of dollar depreciation.  Unantici- 
pated depreciation  as the explanatory  variable  is compatible  with a PPP 
evolution  of nominal  exchange  rates and with an adjustment  of real ex- 
change  rates  that  is dampened,  but  not  offset,  by intervention. 
There also is strong  evidence  of leaning  against  the wind in the equa- 
tions for Japan.  Unanticipated  dollar depreciation  again appears  as the 
relevant  determinant.  The size  of the reaction  coefficient  is similar  to those 
reported  for Germany  and for the rest of the world.  For Japan,  however, 
there  is no evidence  of cyclical  influences  on intervention  policy. 
The intervention  equations  support  the view that  monetary  authorities 
largely  aimed  their  operations  at smoothing  unanticipated  movements  in 
the exchange  rate. For Germany,  the presence  of cyclical variables  also 
suggests  an element  of beggar-my-neighbor  policy in exchange  interven- 
tion. 
26.  On intervention policy and specifically "leaning against the wind" see Paul 
Wonnacott, "Exchange Stabilization in Canada, 1950-4:  A  Comment," Canadian 
Journal  of Economics and Political Science, vol. 24 (May 1958), pp. 262-65; Paula  A. 
Tosini, Leaning against the Wind:  A Standard  for Managed Floating, Princeton Es- 
says in International  Finance, 126 (Princeton University, International  Finance Sec- 
tion, December 1977);  Jacques R. Artus, "Exchange Rate Stability and Managed 
Floating: The Experience of the Federal Republic of Germany,"  IMF Stafi Papers, 
vol. 23  (July 1976), pp. 312-33; Peter J. Quirk, "Exchange  Rate Policy in Japan: 
Leaning  Against the Wind,"  IMF Stafi Papers,  vol. 24 (November 1977), pp. 642-64; 
David  John Longworth, "Floating Exchange Rates:  The  Canadian Experience" 
(Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts  Institute of Technology, 1979); and Stanley W. 
Black, "Central Bank Intervention and the Stability of  Exchange Rates," Seminar 
Paper 136 (University of Stockholm, Institute for International  Economic Studies, 
February 1980), Rudiger  Dornbusch  177 
INTEREST  RATE  POLICIES 
The sensitivity  of exchange  rates  to monetary  policy  interferes  with  the 
ability  of monetary  policy to achieve a noninflationary  real expansion. 
Lowering  interest  rates leads to exchange  rate depreciation  and faster 
inflation  through  rising  import  prices.  Exchange  rate  sensitivity  thus  steep- 
ens the Phillips  curve  when  monetary  policy is used to affect  real output. 
It is not possible to determine  whether  the worsened  trade-off  has sig- 
nificantly  reduced  the use of monetary  policy as an instrument.  What  can 
be investigated  is whether  interest  rates have shown  the cyclical  pattern 
associated  with domestic  stabilization,  declining  during  a recession  and 
increasing  with inflation.  One can also ask whether  exchange  rate depre- 
ciation  exerted  a significant  effect  on interest  rate  policy. 
Table 8 reports  regression  equations  for the German-U.S.  and Japa- 
nese-U.S.  differential  in short-term  interest  rates.  The differential  is used 
on the assumption  that international  cyclical movements  have not been 
closely synchronized.  The German-U.S.  differential  in nominal interest 
rates  is explained  by the current  inflation  differential,  unemployment  in 
the respective  countries,  and the lagged  nominal  interest  rate differential. 
Higher  inflation  differentials  are  reflected  in a higher  nominal  interest  dif- 
ferential.  An increase  of 1 percentage  point  in the German  unemployment 
rate  leads  to a decline  of about  2 percentage  points  in the nominal  interest 
differential.  It cannot  be established  that the flexible  rate system  did not 
weaken  the  use of countercyclical  monetary  policy.  But  the evidence  is that 
relative  interest  rates  continued  to have a clearly  cyclical  pattern. 
In the German-U.S.  case, I found no evidence for either monetary 
growth  targets,  intervention,  or exchange  depreciation  as a significant  in- 
fluence  on interest  differentials.27 
Equations  8-2 to 8-4, explaining  the Japanese-U.S.  interest  rate dif- 
ferential,  provide more evidence of a cyclically stabilizing  pattern of 
nominal  interest  rates.  Higher  inflation  differentials  lead to higher  nomi- 
nal yield differentials.  Higher  unemployment  in Japan  reduces  the rela- 
tive Japanese  interest  rate, while higher unemployment  in the United 
States  raises  it. 
27. For further  evidence  see Jean Tirole, "Exchange  Rate Expectations  and Mone- 
tary Policy: A Structural  Approach for France, Germany, U.K." (Massachusetts 
Institute  of Technology, n.d.). 4~~~~~~~~~~~r  T:  C3 
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Unlike  the German-U.S.  case,  the equations  for Japan  show  high serial 
correlation  of errors  and  are  reported  with  rho  corrections.  Unanticipated 
depreciation  is introduced  in equation 8-3 and shows a significant  co- 
efficient  but with the wrong  sign-higher dollar  depreciation  leads to an 
increased  spread  in favor  of Japan.  The  variable  may  represent  joint  errors 
in the interest  and exchange  rate equations;  or it may merely  pick up 
lagged  adjustment  effects,  as equation  8-4 suggests. 
From  the interest  rate  evidence  it seems  apparent  that,  whatever  limita- 
tions on monetary  policy may exist, interest  spreads  internationally  have 
had the cyclical  pattern  called for by stabilization  objectives.  To that ex- 
tent,  at least,  there  is no clear  demonstration  that  the  flexible  exchange  rate 
system  has limited  the use of instruments.  Furthermore,  there  is no evi- 
dence  that  interest  rates  have  been systematically  affected  by intervention 
or exchange  rate  targets. 
CURRENT  ACCOUNT  ADJUSTMENT  AND  CAPITAL  FLOWS 
The next question  is whether  the flexible  exchange  rate  period  has  been 
one of persistent  and  large  current  account  imbalances  with  exchange  rate 
movements  exerting  relatively  little impact to restore balance. Table 9 
shows means, standard  deviations,  and serial correlation  of current  ac- 
counts  for four major  industrial  countries.  The 1960-73 period of fixed 
exchange  rates is compared  with that of flexible exchange  rates, 1973- 
79. No substantial  change  in current  account  behavior  is apparent.  Im- 
balances  did not become more persistent,  and, in particular,  the United 
States  did not have a persistent  deficit. 
The surprise  of the last few years,  if anything,  is the fact that current 
account  imbalances  are not at all the "sticky  mass"  that Keynes  thought 
they  were.  Instead,  the large  effect  of variations  on current  accounts  and 
the responsiveness  of trade  flows and direct  investment  to real exchange 
rates  lead to a view of great  flexibility  in all important  dimensions  of the 
balance  of payments. 
How have  current  account  imbalances  been financed?  In particular,  to 
what extent  have the large swings  in current  accounts  been financed  by 
stabilizing  private  capital  flows?  As figure  4 shows, exchange  market  in- 
tervention  in the dollar, both transitory  and cumulative,  has been sub- 
tantial compared  to current  account imbalances,  frequently  exceeding 
the latter by a large margin.  In fact, rather than financing  those im- 180  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1980 
Table  9. Current  Account  Balances  as a Percent  of GNP for Four  Industrial 
Countries,  1960-73 and 1973-79 
Percentage  points or correlation 
Statistic 
Standard  Serial 
Period  and  country  Mean  deviation  correlation 
1960-73 
United States  0.4  0.4  0.58 
Germany  0.7  0.9  0.41 
Japan  0.5  1.2  0.39 
United Kingdoma  0.1  1.1  0.37 
1973-79 
United States  0.1  0.6  0.28 
Germany  1.0  0.9  -0.11 
Japan  0.5  0.9  0.61 
United Kingdoms  -0.9  1.8  0.62 
Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
a.  The output measure is gross domestic product. 
balances,  net capital  flows add to them. Deficits  are accompanied  by net 
capital  outflows  and surpluses  by net inflows.  In 1977 and 1978, for ex- 
ample,  the United  States  ran  current  account  deficits  of about  $14 billion, 
while the holdings  of foreign  official  reserve  agencies  increased  by $35 
billion and $32 billion, respectively.  In net terms the foreign private 
sector's  claims  on the United States  were reduced  at a rate of more than 
twice as great as the U.S. deficit.  In 1979, in turn, the U.S. current  ac- 
count was nearly  balanced;  central  bank intervention,  this time in sup- 
port  of foreign  currencies,  amounted  to nearly  $16 billion. 
It appears  that  interest  rate  policy,  adjusted  for depreciation,  was  not at 
all geared toward  financing  current  account  imbalances  and stabilizing 
exchange  rates. On the contrary,  the independent  pursuit  of interest  rate 
policy,  together  with  current  account  surprises,  has given  rise to exchange 
rate  instability,  capital  flows,  and  intervention.  This  has  led to a clear  posi- 
tive relation between the U.S. current  account and the return  on U.S. 
assets,  which  is illustrated  in figure  5. When  the United  States  was in defi- 
cit, the return  on dollar assets, adjusted  for depreciation,  was negative. 
Conversely,  when  the United  States  showed  a surplus,  the return  differen- 
tial,  adjusted  for depreciation,  was  positive. 
A coherent  story  emerges  from  combining  the evidence  in figure  5 with 
that  for  intervention,  exchange  rate  determination,  and  portfolio  selection. 0~~~~~~~~~~~~C 
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Current  account surprises  give rise to unanticipated  fluctuations  in the 
exchange  rate.  There  is no offset  through  interest  rate  policy and,  accord- 
ingly,  real interest  differentials  worsen  for the deficit  country.  The unan- 
ticipated  depreciation  leads central  banks to intervene  in support  of the 
depreciating  currency,  and  the adverse  depreciation-adjusted  interest  dif- 
ferential  leads portfolio  holders  to shift from the depreciating  currency. 
Central  bank  intervention  provides  the umbrella  for  portfolio  holders  to 
shift  their  portfolios  in response  to anticipated  interest  differentials.  Steril- 
ization  of the intervention  implies  that central  banks can largely  pursue 
their interest  rate policy, albeit at the cost of larger  and more dramatic 
intervention  operations. 
Exchange  Rate Flexibility  and the Capital  Mobility  Problem 
The preceding  review  of theory and empirical  evidence  indicates  the 
fundamental  problems  that confront  the design  of an exchange  rate and 
payments  system.  The system  must meet conflicting  needs. On the one 
hand, it should have flexible  real exchange  rates to provide for adjust- 
ment of current  account  imbalances  through  channels  besides deflation 
or protection.  On the other hand, short-term  disturbances  in the real 
sector should be largely accommodated  at unchanging  real exchange 
rates  so that unnecessary  variability  will not be introduced  in the alloca- 
tion of resources.  This accommodation  requires  a mechanism  that en- 
sures  the financing  of current  account  imbalances,  cyclical  or otherwise, 
through  capital  flows.  Furthermore,  financial  disturbances  should  be sub- 
stantially  accommodated  through  asset management-trading one debt 
for another-and  should not affect real activity or the real exchange 
rate. This requires  institutional  arrangements  that make possible large- 
scale sterilized  intervention  or the issuance  of debt denominated  in for- 
eign currency. 
In the 1960s governments  opted for an exchange  rate regime with 
fixed nominal exchange rates, full accommodation  of financial  distur- 
bances  through  pegging  of exchange  rates,  and  a lack  of effective  medium- 
term  adjustment  in the real exchange  rate.  When  the dollar  became  over- 
valued under this regime, it led to the collapse of the system of fixed 
exchange  rates and has left observers  with the impression  that a flexible 
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system. The large disparity of  current inflation rates among countries 
and the imprecision in estimating their respective underlying trend rates 
of inflation make it difficult to formulate viable rules for pegging nominal 
rates, even if there could be agreement on the appropriate real exchange 
rate. 
Once it is accepted that the medium-term real exchange rate should 
be flexible and that tight pegging of nominal rates is infeasible, the range 
of options is reduced to a form of floating rates. There does remain, how- 
ever, a dimension of choice that may add to the stability of the macro- 
economy and that concerns the treatment of capital flows. Should capital 
be free to move in response to expected yields and risks, or should it be 
immobilized? James Tobin  has  summarized one  main  concern  about 
complete freedom of capital movements: 
Under either exchange rate regime the currency exchanges transmit distur- 
bances  originating  in international  financial  markets.  National economies and 
national governments  are not capable of adjusting  to massive movements  of 
funds across the foreign exchanges, without real hardship and without sig- 
nificant  sacrifice  of the objectives  of national economic policy with respect  to 
employment,  output, and inflation.28 
Tobin proposes "to throw some sand in the wheels of our excessively 
efficient international money markets."29  Specifically, he advocates plac- 
ing an internationally agreed, uniform, proportional tax on all spot con- 
versions of one currency into another. The tax would reduce the round 
trip return on international portfolio shifts, and thereby open up an inter- 
est spread that would leave monetary authorities more freedom. The pro- 
posal would virtually eliminate short-term capital flows and allow the 
basic balance,  in  conjunction  with  intervention,  to  determine the  ex- 
change rate. Relieved of the need to cope with massive short-term capital 
flows, interest rate policy would be freer to address domestic objectives, 
and exchange rates would presumably be more stable. 
The Tobin tax proposal presumes that the failure of private short-term 
capital flows to finance current accounts adds to exchange market insta- 
bility and to the need to intervene. Although  capital flows have largely 
failed to play a financing role, they have forced major changes in real 
exchange rates whenever government policies  failed to  aim for cyclical 
28. James Tobin, "A Proposal for  International Monetary Reform," Cowles 
Foundation Discussion Paper 506 (Yale University, October 1978), p. 3. 
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coordination  and  a dampening  of external  imbalances.  Thus  capital  flows 
definitely  promoted  current  account  adjustment,  although  possibly  exag- 
gerating  exchange  rate  instability. 
It is not certain  in what  way the Tobin  tax would  work  to stabilize  ex- 
change  rates.  There  would  be less incentive  to move  capital  internationally 
in response  to small  yield differentials;  but then  the basic  balance  and  the 
extent of central bank intervention  would govern the exchange rate. 
Rather  than  leaning  against  the wind,  central  banks  would  have to take a 
view  of exchange  rates  and  become  rate  setters.  Would  they  want  to main- 
tain nominal  exchange  rates  or would they adjust  real exchange  rates  in 
response  to current  account  imbalances? 
There  is a second,  and  perhaps  more  serious,  objection  to the proposal. 
Suppose  a country  does not have the reserves  to finance  a transitory  cur- 
rent account  imbalance  and thus wishes  to use interest  rate  policy to at- 
tract  capital.  Clearly  such a country  would  now have to increase  interest 
rates  by more  than  it would  in the absence  of the tax. The country  would 
suffer  the burden  of financing  the deficit  and the Tobin tax. There  is, of 
course,  an alternative.  The country  could bring  about  a sufficiently  large 
depreciation  that the expectation  of future depreciation  would be re- 
duced  or eliminated;  then with  unchanged  interest  rates  there  would  be a 
sufficient  expected  yield differential  to attract  capital  inflows.  But again, 
the country  would be paying  for the "sand  in the wheels."30 
The welfare economics of the Tobin proposal is not without ques- 
tion. From the standpoint  of utility  maximization,  the choice of an opti- 
mal portfolio  ranks  on a par with the ability  to choose one's preferred 
diet. To the extent that the portfolio cannot be efficiently  diversified 
solely from  home securities-and this would surely  be the case for small 
countries-the tax is as disturbing  an intervention  as a tariff. 
Once the principle  of free capital  flows is accepted,  there  remains  the 
issue of how to live with them. Capital  flows should  operate  in a stabiliz- 
30. While I argue against the Tobin tax in its worldwide application,  I do think 
there is a forceful case for the tax in isolated instances.  I particularly  note the example 
of the United Kingdom,  where the differential  adjustment  speed of interest  rates and 
inflation, in response to the stabilization  policy, has led to a vast real appreciation. 
A real interest  equalization  tax is warranted  to repel capital inflows  and thus maintain 
a more nearly constant real exchange rate in the adjustment  of prices to lower in- 
flation. For a further discussion see Nissan Liviatan, "Neutral Monetary Policy and 
the Capital  Import Tax" (Hebrew University, October 1979); and Dornbusch, Open 
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ing manner  to finance  transitory  current  account  imbalances  while allow- 
ing real exchange  rate changes  to cope with medium-term  adjustment  in 
the current  account  balance.  It is, in fact, not possible to identify  what 
part of a current  account  balance  it is appropriate  to finance  and what 
part  requires  adjustment.  The proper  policy rule for stabilizing  real ex- 
change  rates  when  confronted  with  short-term  and  financial  disturbances, 
without  affecting  the medium-term  adjustment  of real  rates,  is the follow- 
ing: a country  with a growing  current  account  deficit (particularly  one 
that  occurs  in the process  of unsynchronized  cyclical  movements)  would 
both raise  its real interest  rate and  intervene  by leaning  against  the wind. 
The analysis  of the present  paper shows that only half the rule has, in 
fact, been pursued:  intervention  policy has leaned against  the wind, but 
interest  rate  policy has been the opposite  of what is recommended  here. 
What  are  the policy choices  that are  likely  to induce  more  stable  capi- 
tal flows?  It is easy to identify  three different  areas  for reform.  The first 
concerns  policies  to ease the adjustment  process  of an international  port- 
folio shift  from  dollars  to marks.  That  process  is under  way, and  failure  to 
recognize  the portfolio  substitution  will lead to unnecessary  variability  in 
exchange  rates  and  changes  in the real exchange  rates.  Portfolio  substitu- 
tion implies  a major  problem  for stabilization  policy  because  its dynamics 
are  not clear.  Using  sterilized  intervention  to cope  with  portfolio  shifts  has 
been an appropriate  pragmatic  response.  Two alternatives  are  reshuffling 
more  directly  the currency  denomination  of the existing  stocks  of outside 
assets,  and  issuing  indexed  debt. 
The second reform  is to use monetary  policy deliberately  to induce 
stabilizing  capital  flows.  When  unanticipated,  transitory  disturbances  arise 
in the current  account,  interest  rates  should  be adjusted  to avoid  excessive 
real exchange  rate movements.  That, of course,  will leave less room for 
domestic  activism  or will force  the question  of creating  a better  policy  mix 
for domestic  objectives. 
The third,  and perhaps  the most important  reform,  draws  on the evi- 
dence  that  exchange  rate  movements  largely  reflect  adjustments  to unan- 
ticipated  current  account and cyclical disturbances.  This suggests  that 
efforts  to create  a more  predictable  policy environment  may well make  a 
contribution  to stabilizing  exchange  rates. Comments  by William  H. Branson 
The decade  since the first  meeting  of the Brookings  panel has witnessed 
a complete  revolution  in thinking  about exchange  rate determination,  a 
radical  change  in the portfolio problem facing international  investors, 
both private  and public, and a real depreciation  of the dollar exchange 
rate by approximately  25 percent.  Rudiger  Dornbusch's  paper gives an 
interesting  and  accurate  account  of the development  of theorizing  and  the 
current  state  of empirical  evidence  on exchange  rates,  integrates  this with 
recent work on portfolio diversification,  and then uses this analytical 
framework  to discover  a deutsche  mark shortage  to begin the 1980s. I 
generally  agree  with his views on these matters,  so I have no slashing 
criticism  to make.  However,  I would  look at exchange  rate  theories  from 
a different  perspective. 
Exchange  Rate Theories 
Dornbusch  reviews the evolution of theories of exchange rate de- 
termination  since 1973 or so, and cites empirical  evidence  that generally 
supports  the portfolio-balance  model. One way to view Dornbusch's  ac- 
count is as autobiography.  It accurately  describes  the evolution of his 
thinking  about  exchange  rates as he moved from Dornbusch  1974 vin- 
tage,1  a monetary-PPP  (purchasing  power parity) model, to 1980 vin- 
tage,  a portfolio-balance  model.  His account  of the development  of theory 
is a logical  progression  from the most restrictive  to the least restrictive, 
and  he relaxes  assumptions  as he goes along.  In this respect,  his paper  is 
1. See Rudiger Dornbusch, "Capital Mobility, Flexible  Exchange Rates and 
Macroeconomic  Equilibrium,"  in E. Claassen and P. Salin, eds., Recent Issues in 
International  Monetary Economics, Studies in Monetary Economics, vol.  2  (Am- 
sterdam:  North-Holland, 1976), pp. 261-78. The book is a collection of papers pre- 
sented at a conference  held in Paris in 1974. 
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similar  to Marina  Whitman's  1975 BPEA paper  on "global  monetarism," 
and I propose the same alternative  that I did in commenting  on that 
paper:  begin  with  the most general  framework  of an asset  markets  model 
and  then  narrow  it down  with additional  assumptions  as appropriate. 
As I noted  in my 1975 comments,  a portfolio  model  can  be reduced  to 
a monetary  model  by eliminating  the nonmoney  assets  from  the analysis. 
This is done by assuming  perfect  substitutability  between  domestic  and 
foreign  assets,  or by small-country  assumptions  that make interest  rates 
exogenous.  The additional  simplification  that leads to a monetary-PPP 
model  is to assume  perfect  substitutability  among  goods, so the exchange 
rate  is simply  the ratio  of two price  levels. 
Dornbusch's  review  begins  with this model, which  he labels  the mone- 
tary approach.  The exchange  rate in this model follows the path of the 
two relevant  price  levels, which  in turn  are driven  by excess demands  for 
money in the two countries.  This is the hyperinflation  model in Jacob 
Frenkel's  1980 article;  it is also Dornbusch  vintage 1974. The present 
paper  shows  that  the monetary-PPP  model  will not hold because  PPP has 
not held. The 1970s have been a period  of large  movements  in exchange 
rates vis-a-vis  relative  price levels due to a combination  of real distur- 
bances  and initial  portfolio  disequilibria. 
The next model reviewed  eliminates  the assumption  of short-run  PPP, 
but retains  perfect  substitutability  between  foreign  and domestic  interest- 
bearing  assets,  so the focus is still on money  demand  and supply.  Wealth 
effects  are still excluded  from  money demand.  This is Dornbusch  vintage 
1976.3 This extended  Mundell-Fleming  model does not permit  different 
reactions  of exchange  rates  to demand  expansions  that originate  at home 
or abroad.  The former  should lead to a current  account  deficit  and de- 
preciation;  the latter,  to a surplus  and appreciation.  To bring  the current 
account  into the story, Dornbusch  next introduces  wealth effects, with 
increases  in wealth  coming  from the current  account  and raising  the de- 
mand  for home  goods  relative  to foreign  goods.  This  is Dornbusch  vintage 
1978.4 
2.  For a review of  the reincarnation of  PPP in the  1970s and its subsequent 
demise, see Louka T. Katseli-Papaefstratiou,  The Reemergence of the Purchasing 
Power Parity Doctrine in the 1970's, Special Papers in International  Economics, 13 
(Princeton  University, International  Finance Section, December 1979). 
3. Rudiger Dornbusch, "Expectations  and Exchange Rate Dynamics," Journal 
of Political Economy, vol. 84 (December 1976), pp. 1161-76. 
4.  Rudiger Dornbusch and Stanley Fischer, "Exchange Rates and the Current 
Account,"  American Economic Review (forthcoming in December 1980). Rudiger  Dornbusch:  Comments  by William  H. Branson  189 
The  Dornbusch-Fisher  model  has  an  uncertain  payoff,  though.  Demand 
expansion  at home still leads to appreciation  of the exchange  rate, an 
"uncomfortable"  implication.  This is, after all, the original  implication 
of Robert Mundell's  analysis of fiscal expansion  with "perfect  capital 
mobility."  Fiscal expansion  raises  the interest  rate, causing  an infinitely 
large capital  inflow  and exchange  appreciation.  The evidence,  however, 
is that assets  have sufficiently  low substitutability  that the opposite  is the 
case in Japan  and in the United  States,  with Canada  a borderline  case.5 
At this  point  in Dornbusch's  paper,  however,  with  perfect  substitutability 
the only way to obtain the "normal"  results of demand  expansion  for 
Japan  and  the United  States  is to assume  that  it is accompanied  by mone- 
tary  accommodation. 
This part of the paper makes me feel a bit uneasy. While the two 
models  are  important  parts  of the development  of the literature,  especially 
Dornbusch  vintage 1976, their role here seems mainly to fill the space 
between  vintage  1974 and  vintage  1980, to be discussed  below.  The 1978 
model  is a modification  of 1976, to add the current  account  to the story, 
and it needs a monetary  accommodation  proviso  to fit the stylized  facts. 
It is also  rendered  obsolescent  by the 1980 model. 
This  most  recent  vintage  is discussed  after  the empirical  section  on test- 
ing "news."  These results confirm  the portfolio-balance  model-Dorn- 
busch 1980-so  I will also discuss them below. With his discussion  of 
portfolio  diversification,  Dornbusch  finishes  his review  of exchange  rate 
models  by considering  the portfolio-balance  model  with  imperfect  substi- 
tution between home and foreign assets in portfolio demands.  In this 
model the current  account  affects  the exchange  rate by influencing  port- 
folio composition  as well as wealth. An increase in domestic demand 
generates  a deficit  in the current  account  and reduces  the proportion  of 
foreign  assets  in the portfolio.  This increases  excess demand  for foreign 
assets  and brings  a depreciation  of the exchange  rate. The model is also 
consistent  with  portfolio  diversification  across  currencies. 
5. See Akihiro Amano, "Flexible Exchange Rates and the Macroeconomic  Man- 
agement:  A Study  of the Japanese  Experience  in 1973-78" (Kobe University, 1979); 
William  H. Branson,  discussion  of Sung Y. Kwack and George R. Schink, "A Disag- 
gregated  Quarterly  Model of United States  Trade and Capital  Flows: Simulation  and 
Tests of Policy Effectiveness,"  in Gary Fromm and Lawrence R. Klein, eds., The 
Brookings Model: Perspective and  Recent  Developments  (Amsterdam:  North- 
Holland, 1975), pp. 169-73; and John Helliwell, "Adjustment  under Fixed and Flex- 
ible Exchange  Rates,"  in Peter B. Kenen, ed., International  Trade  and Finance:  Fron- 
tiers for Research (Cambridge:  Cambridge  University Press, 1975), pp. 379-410. 190  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1980 
I now return  to the position of my 1975 comment  on the Whitman 
paper.  In all these  models  except  the strict  PPP approach,  the proximate 
determinants  of  exchange rates are equilibrium  conditions for asset 
markets.  Exchange  rates  are determined  in financial  markets  in the same 
sense as interest  rates are. The most general asset market  model is the 
portfolio-balance  model  with  wealth  effects  and  imperfect  substitutability 
of home  and  foreign  assets.  One  form  of this  model  appears  in my  previous 
work.6  This model can be simplified  by assuming  perfect  substitutability 
or price-taking  behavior  but retaining  wealth effects to obtain the form 
of Pentti  Kouri's  1976 model and the Dornbusch-Fisher  model. Further 
elimination of  wealth effects yields Dornbusch's  monetary-approach 
model. If a PPP explanation  of the exchange  rate is imposed,  the 1974 
models of Frenkel  and Dornbusch  result.  The literature  developed  over 
time from different  initial views of exchange rate determination,  but 
seems  to be converging  to the portfolio-balance  model. 
Empirical  Evidence  on Exchange  Rates 
The empirical  evidence  supports  this convergence.  The monetary-PPP 
model founders  on the assumption  of PPP, which may hold in the long 
run  in the absence  of real disturbances,  or in a hyperinflation,  but did not 
hold during  the decade of the 1970s. There now is ample  evidence  that 
the current  account  matters  for exchange  rate adjustment.  Evidence  for 
the dollar-mark  rate was presented  in the 1976 paper  by Jacques  Artus, 
and some initial results  for the other  major  currencies  were reported  by 
Branson  and Halttunen.7  These, and other studies  that Dornbusch  cites, 
generallv  used actual instead  of unanticipated  variables.  The equations 
6. William H. Branson, "Asset Markets and Relative Prices in Exchange Rate 
Determination,"  Seminar Paper 66  (University of  Stockholm, Institute for Inter- 
national Economic Studies, 1976); William H. Branson,  Hannu Halttunen,  and Paul 
Masson, "Exchange Rates  in  the  Short Run:  The  Dollar-Deutschemark Rate," 
European  Economic Review, vol. 10 (December 1977), pp. 303-24. For a complete 
exposition see Polly R. Allen and Peter B. Kenen, Asset Markets, Exchlange Rates, 
and Economic Integration (Cambridge:  Cambridge  University Press, 1980). 
7. William H. Branson and Hannu Halttunen, "Asset-market  Determination of 
Exchange Rates: Initial Empirical and Policy Results,"  in John P. Martin and Alas- 
dair  Smith,  eds.,  Trade  and  Payments  Adjustment  uinder Flexible  Exchange  Rates 
(London: MacMillan  for Trade Policy Research  Center, 1979), pp. 55-85. Rudiger Dornbusch: Comments by William H. Branson  191 
that  Dornbusch  reports  in table 3 confirm  the broad  conclusion  from the 
previous  studies. 
If the risk-premium  equation  6 is combined  with the estimating  equa- 
tion of table  3, an equation  is obtained  for unanticipated  depreciation  that 
has on the right-hand  side both the current  account  surprise  and the risk 
premium.  The  latter  is an  increasing  function  of the  stock  of foreign  assets, 
as shown  in equation  6. The current  account  surprise  alters  the stock of 
foreign  assets.  Thus  the  results  in table  3 could  reflect  the effect  of changes 
in foreign  asset supplies  on the lisk premium,  rather  than the effects of 
current  account  news. I doubt that this bias is important,  however. It 
should also be noted that it is hard to obtain empirical  verification  of 
equation  6 itself. In summary,  the evidence  is accumulating  that the cur- 
rent account  matters:  surplus  countries  appreciate,  and deficit  countries 
depreciate.  If the major  industrial  countries  are arrayed  from the ones 
with the largest  surplus  to the largest  deficit,  that array  provides  a good 
prediction  of the rank order of appreciation  and depreciation.8 
This evidence  is consistent  with a portfolio-balance  model including 
imperfect  substitution,  and  with a monetary  model having  wealth  effects. 
In his section  on portfolio  diversification  and the mark,  Dornbusch  cites 
literature  on portfolio  diversification  across currencies  as evidence that 
supports  the portfolio-balance  model. In table 5 Dornbusch  presents  the 
variance-covariance  structure on  real  returns for  a  cosmopolitan 
consumer-investor  on short-term  assets  denominated  in dollars,  deutsche 
marks,  yen, and  pounds  sterling.  The low and  frequently  negative  covari- 
ances of real returns  clearly  suggest  imperfect  substitutability. 
Portfolio  Diversification 
In the section  on portfolio  diversification  Dornbusch  provides  an ana- 
lytical  definition  of the meaning  of the term  "dollar  overhang"  and shows 
how this  might  be quantified.  Optimal  portfolio  combinations  among  cur- 
rencies  can be computed  from a vector of expected  real returns  and a 
matrix  of expected  covariances  around  those real returns.  The optimal 
portfolio  is a linear  combination  of a minimum-variance  portfolio  and a 
8. See Louka T. Katseli-Papaefstratiou,  "The Transition to Flexible Exchange 
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zero-net-worth  speculative  portfolio  in which one borrows  in some cur- 
rencies  and  lends  in others  to obtain  a preferred  risk-return  combination. 
An important  element  of the covariance  matrix  in many  of these calcula- 
tions is the negative  covariance  of the mark  and the dollar,  which gives 
both  a large  positive  weight  in the  minimum-variance  portfolio.  Dornbusch 
provides  an illustrative  two-asset  portfolio  that is 50 percent  marks  and 
50 percent  dollars.  The proportions  for the mark and the dollar in the 
minimum-variance  five-currency  portfolio of Pentti Kouri and Jorge  de 
Macedo are 33 percent  and 59 percent,  respectively,  using a 1973-77 
variance-covariance  matrix.  Using a 1973-78 matrix,  Macedo presents 
portfolios  for eight  currencies  under  various  assumptions  concerning  the 
weights  for  investors'  optimal  price  indexes;  there  the  proportion  in marks 
is 14 percent  and in dollars, 34 percent.9  The results  suggest  that, from 
1979 on, an optimum  minimum-variance  portfolio  might  contain  dollars 
in the range of 35 to 45 percent, and marks  in the range of 20 to 30 
percent. 
These  proportions  can  be compared  with  the actual  holdings  of central 
banks.  At the end of 1978, the central  banks  in the aggregate  held special 
drawing  rights  of 167.9 billion in dollars (82.7 percent), 21.2 billion in 
marks (10.4 percent), and 14.1 billion in other currencies  (6.9  per- 
cent).10  If central  banks  were conservative  minimum-variance  investors 
with  currency  preferences  similar  to the private  sector,  these approximate 
proportions  suggest  that the desired  holdings  would be SDR of about  80 
billion  in dollars  (or 40 percent) and  50 billion  in marks  (or 25 percent). 
This official  market  "overhang"  of an SDR excess supply  of 90 billion  in 
dollars and an SDR excess demand  of 30 billion in marks  presumably 
puts  persistent  downward  pressure  on the dollar  and  upward  pressure  on 
the mark,  as Dornbusch  notes. 
An important  feature  of the optimal  portfolio  literature  is the nega- 
tive entries  that come from positive covariances.  In the Kouri-Macedo 
minimum-variance  portfolio,  for example,  the yen and  French  franc  have 
net liability  positions.  This  would  probably  make  the  portfolio  proportions 
9.  See Pentti J. K. Kouri and Jorge Braga de Macedo, "Exchange  Rates and the 
International Adjustment Process," BPEA,  1:1978, p.  129; and Jorge Braga de 
Macedo, "Portfolio Diversification  Across Currencies,"  Discussion Paper 321 (Yale 
University, Economic Growth Center, September 1979), p. 40. 
10. Data are from Beth F. Cobert, "An International Monetary Fund Substitu- 
tion Account: The Proposal and tIs Prospects"  (Princeton University, Senior thesis, 
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arising  from unconstrained  optimization  calculations  inappropriate  for 
official  reserve  holders, although  they might still suggest  currencies  for 
borrowing  by less developed  countries.  Thus  the optimal  portfolio  litera- 
ture  would  at  best  be a guide  to the direction  in which  SDR weights  should 
be adjusted  to make it a more attractive  investment  instrument.  In fact, 
such  an adjustment  seems  to be in the proposal  emanating  from  the April 
meeting  in Hamburg  of the International  Monetary  Fund's  Interim  Com- 
mittee to reweight  the SDR along the line of the Kouri-Macedo  value 
weights.  This reweighting  would  have made  the investment  aspect  of the 
substitution  account  more attractive.  The substitution  account,  in turn, 
could have helped to eliminate  the excess supply of dollars in official 
hands.  It is unfortunate  that agreement  could  not be reached  in Hamburg 
on the substitution  account. 
External  Adjustment  Policy 
I have little to add to Dornbusch's  discussion  of intervention  and ex- 
change  rate  policy.  "Leaning  against  the wind"  in exchange  market  inter- 
vention,  slowing  the movement  of the exchange  rate in either  direction, 
was a phenomenon  that was noticeable  as early as 1975."-  Dornbusch 
documents  this  for Germany  and  Japan;  the same  pattern  of behavior  can 
be observed  for the United Kingdom  and Canada,  and other countries. 
The reaction  function  for Germany  in my paper  with Hannu  Halttunen 
and  Paul  Masson  on the dollar-mark  exchange  rate  also illustrates  leaning 
against  the wind. 
I think  it may also be important  to disaggregate  long-term  and short- 
term capital  for current  account  adjustment  and capital  flows. I am not 
sure I agree  with Dornbusch's  conclusion  about stability  of the current 
account  balance,  but it is clear  that  net long-term  capital  movements  and 
the basic  balance (the sum of the current  account  and long-term  capital 
flows) have  become  less stable  since 1970, as shown  in table 1. The table 
shows  a large  change  in the current  account  in 1975 and 1977; another 
swing  came  in 1979. Long-term  capital  shows  a big increase  in instability 
11. See William H.  Branson, "'Leaning Against the Wind' as Exchange Rate 
Policy" (Geneva: Graduate Institute of International Studies, 1976). The general 
pattern  of intervention  is discussed in a review of  1965-79 in William H. Branson, 
"Monetary  and Fiscal Policy with Adjustable Exchange Rates," prepared for the 
Joint Economic  Committee,  Special Study on Economic Change (Government  Print- 
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Table  1. Components  of the U.S. Balance  of Payments,  1960-77 
Billions  of dollars 
Balance  on  Balance  on  Balanice  on 
currenit  long-term  Basic  short-term  Change  in 
Year  accouint  capital  balancea  capital  reservesb 
1960  2.8  -4.4  -1.6  1.8  -3.4 
1961  3.8  -3.7  0.1  1.4  -1.3 
1962  3.4  -4.6  -1.2  1.5  -2.7 
1963  4.4  -6.0  -1.6  0.3  -1.9 
1964  6.8  -7.1  -0.3  1.2  -1.5 
1965  5.4  -7.4  -2.0  -0.7  -1.3 
1966  3.0  -6.0  -3.0  -3.2  0.2 
1967  2.6  -6.7  -4.1  -0.7  -3.4 
1968  0.6  -2.9  -2.3  -3.9  1.6 
1969  0.4  -4.4  -4.0  -6.7  2.7 
1970  2.3  -6.3  -4.0  5.9  -9.9 
1971  -1.4  -9.1  -10.5  19.2  -29.7 
1972  -5.7  -5.1  -10.8  -0.6  -10.2 
1973  7.1  -7.9  -0.8  4.5  -5.3 
1974  2.1  -6.1  -4.0  4.7  -8.7 
1975  18.3  -17.3  1.0  5.4  -4.4 
1976  4.6  -15.3  -10.7  -0.2  -10.5 
1977  -14.1  -14.8  -28.9  6.1  -35.0 
Source: William H. Branson, "Trends  in United States International Trade and Investment since World 
War II," in Martin Feldstein, ed., The Amnericani  Economy  in Transition  (University of Chicago Press, forth- 
coming), table 44. 
a.  Sum of the first and second columns. 
b. Difference between the third and fourth columns. 
after 1974. The net result  is an increase  in volatility  in the basic balance 
from  the 1960s to the 1970s. The time-series  standard  deviation  increased 
from $1.5 billion  in 1960-69 to $7.8 billion  in 1970-77. 
Short-term  capital movements  do not seem to have been particularly 
stabilizing,  however.  In the eight  years  from 1970 to 1977, the balance  on 
short-term  capital can be viewed as offsetting  the basic balance  only in 
1972 and 1976, and there the quantity  is trivial. This supports  Dorn- 
busch's  inference  that  interest  rate  policies  have  not been aimed  at stabiliz- 
ing the external  accounts.  I read  this evidence  as being  mildly  supportive 
of the "Tobin  tax." 
To conclude,  I think  economists  have  come a long  way  in analyzing  and 
understanding  what is happening  in international  money and exchange 
rates, in the sense of positive economics.  But policy prescription  in the 
new  environment  is just  beginning. Comments  by Mlarina  v. N. Whitman 
Rudiger  Dornbusch's  paper provides an excellent vantage point from 
which  to review  the developments  in exchange  rate theory-or,  alterna- 
tively, balance-of-payments  theory-during  the past decade. In some 
aspects,  it appears  to bring  us full circle to some of the views that pre- 
vailed  before  what  might  be called the "global  monetarist"  revolution  of 
the 1970s in which, as William  Branson  has already  pointed  out, Dorn- 
busch  was a major  participant.  In other aspects,  this paper  is a measure 
of how far economists  have come in understanding  the determination  of 
exchange  rates  and  their  interactions  with  other  macroeconomic  variables 
in open  national  economies. 
As background,  the early 1970s were dominated  in the real world  by 
the shift  from  pegged  to flexible,  though  managed,  exchange  rates,  and  in 
the academic  world  by the shift from a Keynesian  flow-equilibrium  view 
of the balance  of payments-or  the exchange  rate-to  a stock-equilib- 
rium,  asset  market  view. The differences  between  the two approaches  are 
by now quite familiar.  They include,  first, a shift from the definition  of 
equilibrium  in medium-run  flow  terms  to its definition  in long-run  station- 
ary-state  stock  terms;  and second,  a shift in focus from  goods markets  to 
asset markets  or, to put it in somewhat  oversimplified  terms, from the 
balance  of trade  to the balance  of payments. 
Third,  there  was a shift in emphasis  from  real variables,  including  the 
real terms  of trade,  to financial  or monetary  variables.  In addition,  the 
more  monetarist  versions  of this new view stressed  the long-run  neutrality 
of money and the maintenance  of purchasing  power parity (PPP), the 
importance  of commodity  arbitrage  in shortening  up the long run and, 
finally,  the  endogeneity  of the money  supply  under  pegged  exchange  rates. 
Dornbusch  begins this paper, in contrast,  by emphasizing  the inade- 
quacy  of PPP and  discussing  its theoretical  weaknesses.  He focuses  not so 
much on the standard  problems  surrounding  the choice of the correct 
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price  index  or of an equilibrium  base period,  but instead  on the fact that 
both the PPP concept  and  the Keynesian  interest  rate  parity  are  reduced- 
form relations  rather  than structural  ones, meaning  that they do not de- 
scribe behavioral  relations, do not make explicit what is included in 
"other  things  equal,"  and  do not relate  directly  to policy  variables. 
He notes that, in the short run, price stickiness  and nonneutrality  of 
money  obviate  the PPP relationship.  He does not say much  about  its ap- 
plicability  in the long run, although  others  have noted that, even in the 
case of a purely  monetary  disturbance,  the exchange  rate consistent  with 
the new long-run  stock equilibrium  may not bear a pure  PPP relation  to 
the original  exchange  rate. This can occur, for example, if during  the 
transition  period the redistribution  of wealth that takes place through 
current  account  imbalances  alters  the size of the net flows of interest  in- 
come  in the new equilibrium  and,  thus,  the equilibrium  real  terms  of trade 
(that  is, those corresponding  to a zero balance  on the current  account).' 
Dornbusch  then discusses  some empirical  findings,  which essentially 
show that PPP does not hold well over the 1973-79 period  for a number 
of major  currencies.  He also shows  that  significant  changes  have  occurred 
in real exchange  rates, both bilateral  and "effective"  or trade-weighted 
composites,  implying  the need to model rather  than to ignore  changes  in 
real exchange  rates. Dornbusch  adduces empirical  evidence indicating 
that  the second  leg of the monetary  approach,  the proposition  that  interest 
rate differentials  mirror differentials  in inflation rates, does not hold 
either.  I will return  to the reasons  why  below. 
Dornbusch  emphasizes  the central role of the current  account. His 
whole approach  stresses  the distinction  between  this account  and  the rest 
of the balance-of-payments  accounts,  rather  than  drawing  the line further 
down, between  the money account  and everything  else; that is, in terms 
of Branson's  distinction,  he places himself much closer to New Haven 
than to Chicago. 
He also allows  the possibility  of an initial  and  persistent  disequilibrium 
in various  markets.  In this connection,  he notes the role of desired  port- 
1. For a discussion of this point, see Peter Isard, Exchange-Rate  Determination: 
A Survey of Popular Views and Recent Models, Princeton Studies in International 
Finance, 42 (Princeton University, International  Finance Section, May 1978), p. 30; 
and Louka T.  Katseli-Papaefstratiou,  The Reemergence of  the Purchasing Power 
Parity Doctrine in the 1970's, Special Papers  in International  Economics, 13 (Prince- 
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folio diversification  in determining  the exchange  rate and, in his frame- 
work,  this portfolio  diversification  is accomplished  gradually  rather  than 
instantaneously. 
As far as Dornbusch's  model of exchange  rate determination,  circa 
1980, is concerned,  his presentation  is sufficiently  elliptical  that I have 
filled  it out a bit in what  follows  by bringing  to bear  some  points  that  have 
been made  explicitly  by other  authors  but that  I think  are implicit  in this 
paper, or at least are consistent  with it. Parenthetically,  I think Dorn- 
busch's  exposition  demonstrates  some  of the difficulties  of trying  to project 
the essentials  of a seven-equation  dynamic  differential  equation  model 
with three  state variables  onto two-dimensional  graphs. 
Three  groups  of factors  determine  the exchange  rate  in his model.  The 
first  is relative  inflation  rates, which are composed  of trend  or expected 
rates and cyclical  components.  These rates are presumably  not fully re- 
flected in interest  rate differentials  for two reasons: the cyclical com- 
ponent  is not fully anticipated  in his model;  and the monetary  policies  or 
the state  of the credit  markets  may  differ.  In other  words,  tighter  or looser 
monetary  policy, in the popular  nomenclature,  can produce  temporary 
differences  among  countries  in real  interest  rates. 
The second  determinant  of exchange  rates  consists  of portfolio  balance 
requirements,  including  risk diversification  considerations  derived  from 
the Tobin-Markowitz-Sharpe  asset market  models. These models regard 
assets denominated  in different  currencies  as imperfect  substitutes  and 
produce  yield differentials  consistent  with equilibrium,  in the form of a 
risk premium. 
This  risk  premium,  in turn,  depends  in part  on relative  supplies  of out- 
side assets  denominated  in different  currencies-supplies determined  by 
the interactions  of monetary  policies, government  budget deficits and 
official  intervention  in the exchange  markets.2  The risk premium  also 
depends  on the relative  demands  for assets  denominated  in different  cur- 
rencies,  which are determined  by shifts in portfolio preferences.  These 
depend  in turn  on the variances  and  covariances  of real  yields  on different 
assets  and on both actual  and  expected  shifts  in the distribution  of wealth 
through  current  account  imbalances. 
2.  Michael P. Dooley  and Peter Isard, "The Portfolio-Balance Model of  Ex- 
change Rates,"  International  Finance Discussion Paper 141 (Board of Governors  of 
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The third  group of factors affecting  the exchange  rate are those that 
affect  the equilibrium  real  terms  of trade;  namely,  changes  in the level and 
composition  of  demand. Thus, to generate unanticipated  changes in 
exchange  rates, the model is cast in terms of the effects of income and 
current  account "surprises":  income is associated  with the level of de- 
mand,  and  the current  account  is associated  with  its composition. 
If all three  of these  groups  of factors  are  put together,  they  imply  three 
different  effects  of the current  account  on the exchange  rate. This is re- 
habilitation  of the current  account  with  a vengeance. 
Two of these effects are indirect.  One is that stemming  from wealth 
redistribution  through  imbalances  in the current  account,  which  leads by 
distributional  effects  in asset  markets  to the need for offsetting  changes  in 
exchange  rates  to restore  equilibrium.  The other  arises  from  the changes 
in relative  supplies  of assets denominated  in different  currencies,  which 
are brought  about by the financing  of current  account  imbalances  in a 
world of what are, at least intermittently,  managed  rather  than purely 
flexible  rates. 
A more  direct  effect  is that  current  account  shifts  serve  in this  model  as 
signals  for equilibrium  changes  in real  relative  prices  to be brought  about 
by exchange  rate movements.  I believe this effect is grounded  in an as- 
sumption,  which, again, is not made explicit here but is discussed  else- 
where  by Isard.3  The assumption  is that market  participants  expect real 
rates  to shift  in such a way that they prevent  the infinite  accumulation  of 
current  account  imbalances  in either  direction. 
Finally,  Dornbusch  ties his model to rational  expectations.  That  is, he 
assumes  that people know and act immediately  on the systematic  com- 
ponents  of the economic  environment  in which they live. Unfortunately, 
the systematic  components  tend to be dominated  by unsystematic  or 
random  components. 
This assumption  of rational expectations  does not provide a stable 
anchor  for expectations  by which one can connect the short run with 
long-run  equilibrium  exchange  rates and make the latter determinate. 
Elsewhere,  again,  Isard  has suggested  that  one can create  such an anchor 
if one assumes  that market  participants  evaluate  new information  about 
3.  Peter Isard, "Expected and Unexpected Changes in  Exchange Rates: The 
Roles of  Relative Price Levels, Balance-of-Payments Factors, Interest Rates and 
Risk," International Finance Discussion Paper 156  (Board of  Governors of  the 
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price  variables  on the expectation  that  exchange  rates  will exhibit  PPP in 
the long run, and that they evaluate  new information  about balance of 
payments  or real terms-of-trade  factors  on the expectation  that the time 
path of real exchange  rates will avoid current  account  imbalances  from 
accumulating  indefinitely,  which  seems eminently  reasonable.4 
But even this pair of expectations,  it seems to me, is sufficient  to as- 
sure determinacy  only if there is no feedback from exchange  rates to 
behavioral  parameters.  Otherwise,  short-run  departures  from long-run 
equilibrium  will alter  the latter.  That is, there  is no guarantee  that  if one 
gets off the stable expectations  path for any reason,  one will necessarily 
get back to it. 
The fact that changes  in monetary  and intervention  policies affect  not 
only spot interest  and exchange  rates  but also expectations  about  future 
rates, incidentally,  explains  why interest-parity  forecasts are such poor 
predictors  of spot rates. 
In what  sense is all this an amalgam  of the old and the new?  It brings 
the story  full circle;  that  is, it retums  to the Keynesian  conventional  wis- 
dom in several  respects.  One is the emphasis  on goods markets,  on the 
level and composition  of demand-and output  is demand-determined  in 
this model-and  thus on the importance  of the current  account  in de- 
termining  exchange  rates. (The capital account,  to which I will return 
below,  is viewed  as secondary,  not only in a positive  sense  but also, rather 
subtly,  in a normative  one.) The model also incorporates  price  stickiness, 
persistent  deviations  from PPP, and real price changes  through  changes 
in the exchange  rate. Finally, it allows  for persistent  disequilibria  in ex- 
change  markets,  in particular  the famous dollar  surplus  or overhang,  or 
deutsche  mark shortage, however one prefers to characterize  it. The 
model thus incorporates  several  important  aspects of the conventional 
wisdom  that  may  have disappeared  from  the universities  during  the 1970s 
but  that  never  really  disappeared  from  the streets. 
On the other  hand,  there are many  new factors  reflected  here that are 
derived  from the monetary  revolution  of the 1970s. In fact, all the old 
factors  I just  mentioned  are  embedded  in a new  framework. 
Dornbusch's  formulation  incorporates  stationary-state  stock equilib- 
rium  conditions  and  stock-flow  interactions.  He discusses  the dynamics  of 
the difference  between  short-run  and long-run  effects  of disturbances  as 
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well as the transition  paths.  He accounts  for asset  markets  and commod- 
ity markets  and  in that  sense  presents  us with  a general  equilibrium  frame- 
work.  He links  the future  and  the  present  through  expectations.  His model 
is grounded  in rational expectations  plus "surprises,"  making an im- 
portant  distinction  between  anticipated  and  unanticipated  events.  Finally, 
he incorporates  portfolio  diversification  considerations  from  asset  market 
theory. 
What  are  the  implications  of this  new  eclecticism  for hypothesis  testing? 
The Dornbusch  formulation  implies that the appropriate  variables  for 
explaining  changes  in the exchange  rate are forecast errors  rather  than 
realized  magnitudes.  This has a radical implication  for exchange  rate 
forecasting,  which  is, in essence,  that it cannot  be done. His model thus 
provides  a very elegant  rationale  for why it is impossible  to forecast  ex- 
change  rates  successfully  in a world  dominated  by the unexpected. 
A corollary  of this main  point is that one cannot  predict  the effects  of 
policy shifts  on exchange  rates  unless  one knows  whether  they are antici- 
pated or unanticipated,  by now not a new idea. Furthermore,  it provides 
an explanation  of why forward  rates are such poor predictors  of future 
spot rates. 
What  are the implications  for policy?  In general,  the approach  Dorn- 
busch  takes  here  is much  more  interventionist  than  that  of the monetarists 
so that, in yet another  respect,  Keynesianism  emerges  again. (This link 
between Keynesianism  and interventionism  is not a logically necessary 
association,  but it is certainly an empirically  observable  one.)  Dorn- 
busch's interventionism  arises both because he allows persistent dis- 
equilibria  in various  markets  and  because  he sees volatility  as inherent  in 
the system  and  not just due to stupidity  or insufficient  stabilizing  specula- 
tion or other  correctable  market  imperfections. 
Specifically,  his view offers  an argument  for intervention  as a possible 
anchor  for expectations.  He raises  no objection  to the "smoothing"  that 
seems to have dominated  observed official intervention,  and he gives 
what  is essentially  Mussa's  argument  about  the government's  buying  credi- 
bility for its policies by "putting  its money where  its mouth  is" through 
exchange-market  intervention.5 
In other  words,  while governments  in general  may not be able to pre- 
dict the future  better  than anyone  else, they may be better  predictors  of 
5.  Michael Mussa, "The Role of Official Intervention,"  paper prepared for the 
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their  own future  behavior  than participants  in the private  market.  How- 
ever,  and  this  brings  me to a second  policy  implication  of the Dornbusch 
analysis,  this would only be true if such intervention  were coupled  with 
far greater  predictability  of the policy environment  than exists today. 
Such  predictability  is crucial  in a world  where  exchange-rate  volatility  is 
due  primarily  to the interaction  between  surprises  or "news"  and  rational 
expectations,  which  leads  to discontinuous  jumps  in spot  rates. 
In evaluating  how well the present system works, Dornbusch  gives 
fairly  high marks  to intervention  when it is used for smoothing,  but not 
when it has so-called cyclical components (that is, anticyclical  effects 
domestically),  which  he terms  "beggar-my-neighbor"  behavior.  He also 
gives  a fairly  optimistic  assessment  of the cyclical  stabilization  role  played 
by interest  rates  under  managed  flexibility  and  to the ability  of changes  in 
the exchange  rates  to bring  about  current  account  adjustment.  The prob- 
lems lie, in his view, in the destabilizing  role of capital  flows,  to which  he 
assigns  essentially  second-class  citizenship,  suggesting  implicitly  that  they 
do not contribute  to the maximization  of world efficiency  or economic 
welfare  in the same  way that international  commodity  flows  do. As a re- 
sult of the destabilizing  behavior of capital flows, Dornbusch  argues, 
current  account  adjustment  comes  at the cost of substantial  exchange  rate 
volatility. 
Dornbusch  rejects  a Tobin, or transactions,  tax on foreign exchange 
transactions  as a means  of alleviating  the volatility  problem.  But he does 
so for essentially  interventionist  rather  than free-market  reasons,  that is, 
because  of its effect  on the autonomy  of government  actions  rather  than 
on the autonoiny  of participants  in the private  market.  In any case, this 
rejection  leads hiim  to some schizophrenia  about the use of monetary 
policy.  Should  it be directed  externally,  toward  stabilizing  exchange  rates, 
or internally,  toward  the stabilization  of domestic  income,  as it apparently 
has  been  in most  major  industrial  countries? 
Reflection  on this very interesting  and provocative  paper leaves me 
with  two final  questions.  Is there  danger  in letting  the tail wag the dog- 
emphasizing  exchange  rate stability  as an end in itself rather  than as a 
means to achieve worldwide  stability  and growth of income, which is 
presumably  the  ultimate  goal?  And must  economists  again  address  Robert 
Mundell's  old problem  of having  one policy instrument  too few-a  prob- 
lem referred  to rather  obliquely  here as "the  question  of creating  a better 
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shift really  resolved  the problem  of needing  as many  policy instruments 
as there are policy targets,  as the literature  of the prerevolutionary  era 
seems  to suggest? 
In sum, the amalgamation  of the old wisdom  of the 1950s and 1960s 
with  the new wisdom  of the 1970s found  in this paper  brings  a great  deal 
of new understanding  yet leaves many old questions  still unanswered  as 
we start  the 1980s. General  Discussion 
Rudiger  Dornbusch  differed  with Branson's  emphasis  on the importance 
of the current  account-portfolio  channel.  He noted that  the differences  in 
national portfolio diversification  preferences  depend on differences  in 
consumption  patterns  and on real exchange-rate  variability.  The role of 
these factors  in influencing  exchange  rate movements  may well be small 
relative  to the influence  of changes in the relative supplies of outside 
assets  created  through  budget  deficits  or intervention.  Dornbusch  added 
that,  in some cases-such  as the recent  appreciation  of the pound ster- 
ling-terms-of-trade  effects  could dominate  any  portfolio  considerations. 
Dornbusch  also disagreed  with Branson's  reading  of the empirical  evi- 
dence on the impact  of fiscal expansion  on the exchange  rate. He noted 
work  by John  Helliwell  showing  that, for the United States  and Canada, 
a fiscal  expansion,  given nominal  money,  leads to currency  appreciation 
in the expanding  country.  Dornbusch  also pointed  out that,  in contrast  to 
Branson's  characterization,  his early work did explore the roles in ex- 
change rate determination  of  current accounts and imperfect asset 
substitution. 
Peter  Kenen  suggested  modeling  two processes  that  are  mirrored  in the 
current  account:  disturbances  that impinge  directly  on the goods market 
and that change  the terms  of trade  in the long run, and saving and dis- 
saving.  Leaving  goods-market  disturbances  aside,  PPP governs  exchange 
rates  in the long run.  Instantaneously,  exchange  rates  clear  asset  markets. 
Saving  determines  the current  account  and the evolution  of the exchange 
rate  to its long-run  equilibrium.  The exchange  rate  is thus  an asset  market 
phenomenon  in the short  run;  while its evolution  to long-run  equilibrium 
is governed  by saving,  or its counterpart,  the current  account  balance. 
Kenen endorsed  Marina  Whitman's  observations  that one of the ex- 
pected  advantages  of flexible  exchange  rates  is the greater  autonomy  that 
system  would provide  to monetary  policy. Until more is known about 
203 204  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1980 
its costs and benefits,  he could see little basis for making  exchange  rate 
stability  a major goal of monetary  policy. Hendrik  Houthakker  coun- 
tered  that monetary  policy autonomy  is desirable  only when the policies 
followed  are wise; he believed  that until recently  U.S. polices have been 
particularly  poor and  that  fixed  exchange  rates  might  be preferable  for the 
discipline  they imposed  on the monetary  authorities.  Robert  Hall noted 
that Dornbusch's  analysis  supports  the policy of issuing  bonds denomi- 
nated  in foreign  currency  so as to allow  the domestic  monetary  authorities 
to stabilize  their currencies  while adhering  to their domestic  monetary 
growth  targets  even when these are associated  with low interest  rates. 
Houthakker  was intrigued  by the close association  that Dornbusch 
found  between  real interest  rates  and the current  account.  This indicated 
that  the system  was quickly  bringing  about  exchange  rate  movements  that 
would adjust  current  account  imbalances. 
Several  panel  members  suggested  additions  to the analysis.  Kenen  ques- 
tioned the ability of Dornbusch's  current  account measure  to capture 
surprises  adequately  and suggested  that equations  that explain actual 
rather  than unanticipated  movements  might perform  better. But Dorn- 
busch  replied  that intervention  equations  with unanticipated  changes  are 
more stable and have less serial correlation.  Robert  Lawrence  suggested 
that the effective  deutsche  mark  exchange  rate might  give better  results 
than the bilateral  dollar-deutsche  mark  rate. Houthakker  reasoned  that 
OPEC should have been treated explicitly in the analysis along with 
developing countries. But Dornbusch argued that OPEC should be 
treated  as one of many investors  in his model. However, George Perry 
suggested  that  unlike  other  investors,  OPEC  might  have  to take  the effects 
of its own actions  into account. 
William  Fellner  observed  that  if, for whatever  reason,  nominal  interest 
rate differentials  failed to reflect expected inflation  differentials,  move- 
ments  in the spot exchange  rates  would  be large.  In order  to maintain  PPP 
in the long run,  the spot rate  would  move in response  to changes  in those 
expectations  to the point at which expected  future  exchange  rate move- 
ments  plus the sticky  interest  differential  approximate  the expected  infla- 
tion differential.  These changes  in exchange  rates constitute  part of the 
yield expected  by diversifying  investors.  An important  reason  why inter- 
est differentials  do not adjust fully, and why spot rates consequently 
moved so much, is that the bulk of dollar holders, generally  U.S. resi- Rudiger Dornbusch: General Discussion  205 
dents, are unlikely  to diversify  since they would be increasing  the risks 
important  to them  by doing so. 
A  number  of other comments  were addressed  to Dornbusch's  hy- 
pothesis  of a deutsche  mark  shortage.  Lawrence  believed  the real puzzle 
is why diversification  toward  marks  has proceeded  so slowly. He sug- 
gested that reluctance  by German  officials  to assume  a reserve  currency 
role might  have attenuated  some of the trend  toward  diversification  in the 
past; and he noted that German  officials  now seem more inclined  to ac- 
cept such  a role. William  Brainard  questioned  the reliability  of treating  ex 
post  yields  and  covariances  in the portfolio  analysis  as if they  were  ex ante 
structural  parameters.  The substantial  negative covariance  itself may 
simply  reflect  the unanticipated  appreciation  of the mark.  He noted that 
Dornbusch  had shown  that  most of the ex post exchange  rate  movements 
were  unanticipated;  consequently,  they could not have entered  into typi- 
cal portfolio  decisions.  Alternatively,  if the difference  between  the mean 
real return  on dollars and marks over the period studied  is treated as 
anticipated,  as its use in Dornbusch's  portfolio analysis  implies,  it indi- 
cates an implausibly  large degree of risk aversion-the  7 percentage 
point differential  in real returns  results  in an optimal  portfolio of only 
56 percent  marks compared  with 50 percent marks in the minimum- 
variance  portfolio.  George  von Furstenberg  noted that official  portfolios 
are included  in the total movement  away from dollars.  He pointed out 
that officials  are constrained  in their  reserve  portfolio  allocations  and are 
likely  to diversify  to other  currencies  only when  the dollar  is strong. 